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The United States is facing a fiscal crisis at the same time it is facing a military crisis. 
The United States military needs to continue investing in future technologies and 
capabilities while also adapting to multiple new challenges and threats. The 
competing spending between federal programs makes all of this more complicated 
and the federal budget needs to be invested across a spectrum of critical areas. While 
an increase in military spending is needed, the question of how to effectively spend 
U.S. resources to remain on the most powerful military in the world needs to be re-
examined. This thesis seeks to look back at historical examples to help chart a path 
ahead. The Department of Defense will need to show Congress it is making every 
effort to invest and modernize in a fiscally responsible manner, but this is not beyond 
the capabilities of the Department. The United States rose to military power in an era 
of similar constraints, but the adaptability and ingenuity of the American worker, 
soldier, sailor, airman, and marine allowed the U.S. to excel with new technology. 
Prior to World War Two, the United States faced massive deficits, economic 
downturn, unemployment, and a public skeptical about United States power 
projection. Policy makers and the military navigated through this to create the most 
powerful fighting forces in the world and the ingenious PAC-10 carrier strike group 
doctrine, which transformed the face of naval warfare.  
 Fast-forward into the future and the Department of Defense and the military 
branches have struggled in some cases to contain costs and provide the capability 
upgrades they seek for the warfighter. The Department focused very heavily on the 
‘systems of systems’ concept in pursuit of a revolution in military affairs. The Joint 
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Tactical Radio System, which is covered in part two of this study, is a perfect 
example of these phenomena. In the end, the program did not create the results or war 
fighter capability that the program set out to create. On top of this, it cost a significant 
amount of time and money, just to require the Department to find an alternative 
solution in Iraq. 
 The Department also looked to make large investments in the 90s and 2000s 
into capital weapon systems to respond to forecasted need. The F/A-22 and the DDG-
1000 were two examples of revolutionary acquisition that went off budget and off 
schedule. At the same time, the U.S. military also pursued successfully evolutionary 
acquisition and spiral development programs within the DDG-51 and the F/A-18E/F. 
The study concludes with a look at the how the Department should go about with 
future projects. Using the above weapons systems as examples, the study seeks to 
prove that evolutionary acquisition and spiral development needs to be considered to 
provide combat power and systems in quantities to meet the threat, but also provide 
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The United States military and the national security community are at a 
crossroads. The security strategies and systems that supplied the armed forces that led the 
United States through the Cold War and into the 21st century are in need of alteration if 
the United States wants to enjoy same supremacy, or something similar.   With the rapid 
expansion of technology and information systems in the 21st century, the landscape has 
changed, and adversaries are catching up to the United States. The barrier to entry for a 
lethal military is now lower, and regional adversaries and non-state actors are threatening 
the existing global structure. On top of these challenges, the U.S. faces mounting budget 
crises and competing political priorities that mean the military needs to invest in more 
cost effective solution. The U.S. military and policymakers need to pursue a strategy to 
incrementally improve combat systems and capabilities, rather than attempting to take 
large steps with new systems that in most cases spiral out of control in cost.  While an 
increase in military spending is needed, the question of how to effectively spend U.S. 
resources to remain on the most powerful military in the world needs to be reexamined 
and we must remember how the U.S. innovated and rose to its position in the world. 
To meet the threats of today, the United States needs to continue to increase its 
military budget. The Trump Administration, in its National Security Strategy, sees those 
challenges coming from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, as well as from transnational 
threat groups like terrorist organizations or international crime organizations.1 The 
Obama Administration also viewed the global threat matrix similarly.2 This demonstrates 
                                                        
1 The White House. "National Security of the United States of America. 2017 
2The Obama Administration. "The National Security Strategy: 2015."  
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the nature and the longevity of the threat; it also exemplifies the complexity and range of 
the different type of capabilities and challenges the military needs to consider when 
planning to confront these different situations and threat actors. The U.S. military needs 
to be able to respond to great power threats, contain rogue and potentially nuclear states, 
and fight asymmetric wars all at potentially the same time. This requires varying skills, 
technology, and tactics that cannot be met by a one size fits all approach or system 
These challenges require a military that is well equipped, supported, and flexible. 
A theme running through the National Security Strategies of both Obama and Trump 
Administrations is the need to restore our military capability.  The United States spends a 
historically low amount on the military, both in percentage of federal spending and 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).3 To add to that, the military has sustained a 
high operations tempo that degraded equipment and troop readiness at high levels. The 
Department of Defense is consuming resources at a faster pace than anticipated and needs 
an injection of sustained capital investment to rebuild the worn down systems and repair 
the fatigue that the force has endured.4 In the next decade alone the U.S. military could 
face and over $370 billion in deferred modernization alone, which will continue to put 
pressure on the budget.5 The U.S. can no longer take its qualitative edge for granted and 
will need to invest in future technologies if it is to operate against the current challenges 
of Russian, China, Iran, North Korea, and international terrorism, all which present a very 
                                                        
3The World Bank. "Military Expenditure (% of Central Government Expenditures)." The World 
Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.ZS?locations=US&name_desc=true. 
4 McCain, John. "Restoring American Power: Recommendation for the 2018-2022 Defense 
Budget.” https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-
68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf. 
5 Eaglen, Mackenzie. Repair and Rebuild: Balancing New Military Spending for a Three-Theater Strategy. 
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2017. 
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diverse set of challenges.6 On top of needing to invest more, the United States Military 
needs targeted investment. The Department of Defense needs to work within the 
constraints of the current political and acquisition system. The Department cannot risk 
revolutionary jumps forward and focus on evolving its systems in a much less risky 
fashion. 
Even though military spending is historically low as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product, publically and intergovernmental held debt is historically high, with 
the U.S. Federal Reserve reporting it is hovering at 105 percent of GDP.7 This debt is not 
only a burden to future spending, but it is a direct threat to national security. At first 
glance spending can seem to be heavily favoring defense, and the discretionary budget 
does provide significant resources to defense, but that only tells one third of the story. 
U.S. debt is being driven not by military spending, or even other programs on the 
discretionary side of the budget, but by mandatory spending programs, which have very 
little Congressional oversight, and interest on the publically held debt, which are 
projected to increase rapidly over the next few years and exert more pressure on the 
budget.8  
While the U.S. government does need to get its fiscal house in order, and nothing 
should be off the table, fiscal reform needs to be thoughtful. Most of the immediate harm 
that the military has endured from poor investment stems from the Budget Control Act of 
2011, which was meant to be a legislative dead man switch never to be flipped. The law 
                                                        
6 Department of Defense. "2018 National Defense Strategy: Sharpening the American Military's 
Competitive Edge." 2018. 
7 Desilver, Drew. "5 Facts about the National Debt." Pew Research2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/17/5-facts-about-the-national-debt-what-you-should-know/. 
8 Congressional Budget Office. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Budget Office, 2018. 
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was passed by a bi-partisan coalition in 2011 as a response to mounting government debt 
and Congressional demands that a dollar for dollar but reduction accompany any new 
authorization for the United States to issue more debt.  The Budget Control Act would 
implement harsh cross-governmental cuts called sequestration. The Budget Control Act 
contained a delayed onset, which would allow for a super committee to meet and discuss 
how to implement bipartisan changes to spending. The super committee was unable to 
come up with an agreement and government spending was on track to experience 
sequestration.  In 2013, when the Budget Control Act was enacted and sequestration took 
effect, the Department of Defense was faced with making across the board cuts to all 
accounts rather than targeted reforms9. This resulted in uncontrolled damage across the 
department resulting from cancelled purchase contracts to delayed training exercises.10 
Fast forward to the current period and Congress has passed budget deals to increase the 
amount of money allowed before sequestration takes effect, but it is still not enough to 
repair the harmful effects that the Department has endured.  
 This study seeks to consider the current defense needs of the United States within 
this budget context and realities of the tasks at hand. While spending reform is needed, 
the United States cannot approach the military budget with a reductionist mindset.  The 
Department of Defense needs to proactively and quickly move to implement spending 
reforms so it can procure and maintain the best equipment at the best prices, all while 
maintaining the ingenuity that propelled the U.S. military to its place of prominence. The 
                                                        
9 Harrison, Todd. "What has the Budget Control Act of 2011 Meant for Defense?" Center for Strategic and 
International Studies2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-has-budget-control-act-2011-meant-defense. 





Department has a history riddled with case studies of cost overruns, off schedule projects, 
and unmet expectations that leave critical capabilities out of the U.S. policymakers’ 
playbook. The Department also has a rich history of innovation that allowed it to make do 
with the resources it had at the time and propelled it beyond its competitors and enemies. 
This is not assignment of blame for the Department of Defense, maintaining a strong lead 
over near-peer competitors requires innovation and more importantly funding  In this 
fiscal and political environment, the United States needs to work to get the most out it 
dollar. The first part looks at innovation in the inter-war and World War Two eras. The 
United States was facing similar conditions, coming off large government spending 
programs, a skeptical political culture, and a tight fiscal house. Military planners, 
strategists, and advanced industry were able to build the PAC-10 fast attack carrier 
strategy that helped lead to victory in the Pacific.   
The U.S. military, in the early twentieth century, differed greatly from the 
institution we see today. Taking into account the differences in societal structure and 
technology, the U.S. military also was supported by a different economy and economic 
capacity. With the industrial revolution producing huge gains in technical achievement 
and manufacturing, a new era of weaponry and tactics was about to emerge and transform 
the U.S. military. The military was not built to be an expeditionary force projecting 
power across two oceans, but ingenuity and calculated risks helped transform it. 
 Aircraft carriers and naval aviation proved to be the new, advanced concept that 
most heavily industrialized nations wanted to exploit. While the British harnessed the 
technology first, the political climate and budgetary situation bt imperial ambitions and 
the Great War meant the nation never was able to take advantage of carrier aviation. The 
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United States harnessed this technology to build a strong and innovative capability and 
incorporate these technologies into naval strategy.  The United States was able to do this 
in part because of the strong industrial base, and also because of sound development of 
naval doctrine and incremental increasing of capabilities. The first two fast attack carriers 
began as cruisers, but had to be converted to meet treaty obligations. The U.S. Navy 
figured how to use this non-traditional technology, incrementally upgraded its 
capabilities, and introduced the fast attack carrier doctrine, all within a short time span.  
Targeted investment in technological advances turned out one of the most formidable 
naval formation in history, and secured the United States’ position as the most capable 
and powerful military of the 20th century. The political support for the program also 
served as a major boost. Unlike in Britain, where service competition took valuable 
resources away from naval aviation, the U.S. Military did not allow inter-service 
competition to get in the way of the progress the same way that the British did, although 
there was a healthy amount.  Policymakers and Congress supported this with targeted 
legislation, specifically appropriations, but not to the same levels as we see today. This 
all played a crucial role, and proves to be a significant difference between today’s 
environment and then. Services are now competing heavily for a choked off funding 
stream, and unlike in the 1930s and 40s, the threat is much more intangible. At the dawn 
of World War Two, leaders could rely on their constituencies noticing a threat in Europe, 
or at least a change in geopolitical tensions. Although the United States had a healthy 
camp of supporters who wanted to maintain neutrality from any conflict, there was at 
least a threat that the public could grasp. Now, the United States faces multiple threat 
vectors from very heterogeneous enemies. One set of tools will not be able to handle all 
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the threats, and it is hard to make the argument that more is needed. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. experience in World War Two, which arguably made the U.S. Navy the most 
powerful in the world, and secured the position for a generation, provides a cautionary 
tale about what could happen if policy makers allow service infighting, such as what 
happened in the British military and over ambitious projects drown out innovative and 
incremental developments. 
 That point aside, the United States still needs to harness this ingenuity as it 
moves into the 21st century, but it needs to do so in a fiscally responsible manner. The 
lesson learned from U.S. naval aviation in the Second World War should be a lesson to 
military planners.  The Department of Defense needs to focus on acquisitions that are 
technically achievable as well. The second part of the study looks into the issue of what 
makes systems technically achievable and what happens when the United States pursues 
revolutionary technology that is beyond the scope of possibility. Industry developing 
weaponry for the Defense Department is overburdening the process with requirements 
ending in unfeasible systems, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System’s Ground Mobile 
Radio. The second part focuses solely on this system for the reason that it shows that 
over-zealous requirements can lead to waste and failed acquisitions. In the case of Joint 
Tactical Radio System, there was a technological achievement as it helped introduce the 
concept of software defined radios across a broad spectrum of military applications, but 
specifically the program broke under its own weight and never fully fielded due to cost 
overruns and lack of technical achievements. Moreover, the U.S. military pursued a 
revolution in military affairs aggressively as the thinking was that a modernized and 
interconnected force would rule the 21st century. While the thought process and doctrine 
 8 
was sound, pushing the technological envelope to realize gain created political and fiscal 
issues that hamstrung modernization efforts. The U.S, at the beginning of the 21st 
century, seemed fixated on achieving a revolution in military affairs, and at any cost. 
While it would be unfair to say that the pursuit of this technical evolution did not yield 
results, it did consume a large amount of time and resources.  The U.S. Military did see a 
significant change in the way it absorbed battlefield data and communicated, but more 
generally the U.S. can look back at a score of failed programs, in addition to Joint 
Tactical Radio System, that point to overspending for little results in some cases. 
Finally, the U.S. military and policy makers should look at proven development 
and acquisition techniques for use in the future. Evolutionary acquisition and spiral 
development prove cost effective and introduce new and needed technology while 
removing the risk from the procurement system. This third part looks at some of the 
largest programs of recent and compares them to some of the older, successful legacy 
systems in the active arsenal. These comparisons are meant to stoke discussion and 
cannot be truly evaluated on an even scale, as the military developed the platforms to 
meet different requirements.  What these examples do have in common is both the Air 
Force and the Navy saw them as bringing combat capabilities into the modern era and 
create a strong backbone of a future force.  This study looks F-22, F/A – 18, DDG-1000 
class of ships, and DDG -51 class of ships. The study seeks to prove that by slowly 
upgrading legacy systems. In this case the DDG-51 and F/A -18, which are legacy 
systems, combat power is brought online in a less risky fashion and saves the taxpayer 
money. Juxtaposed, the cutting edge technology in the F-22 and DDG-1000 proved 
incredible capability, but cost overruns and technical challenges limited the system buys 
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and the small quantities procured did not fulfill the intended requirement. The 
Department of Defense must decide how to approach technology in the most cost 
effective manner. That means the Department of Defense needs to look at it developing 
new technologies or building and evolving on old system to adapt with new technology. 
The U.S. military is currently working with older legacy systems and adapting them to 
the new fight, in lieu of brand new equipment because of the political fights that have 
embroiled federal spending in the last few years. Looking into the future acquisition 
programs, there needs to be a healthy mix of new cutting edge systems, but these cutting 
edge systems sometimes put the services at a capability loss when the programs do not 
produce the needed quantities to fill the requirement, meaning the burden falls on older 
technology to make up the shortfall.  
 Military technology is inherently different and with the changing nature of 
technology there is no true way to compare apples to apples. Comparing Joint Tactical 
Radio System, the DDG-1000, DDG-51, F-18, and F-22 leaves a lot of room for debate 
and challenge as each of these systems was imagined for differing roles, needs to deal 
with differing combat stresses, and operate with completely differing systems and 
technology. Ideally the arguments would be apples to apples comparison.  Comparing 
this technology, and the acquisition strategy of pre-Cold War military and even pre-
volunteer military also creates its own unique sets of challenges as the population that 
troops are drawn from is completely different and other limiting factors. This study also 
does not take into account the role of Congress in the life of procurement process. Budget 
gimmicks, the Budget Control Act, and Continuing Resolutions provide an unstable and 
uncertain future for these programs and the services in general. The military, coming off 
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multiple wars, has provided for the nation above and beyond their calling and has worked 
very resourcefully as of recent to invest and focus on warfighter needs and readiness. 
Coupled with a more conservative and incremental approach to rebuilding and refreshing 
the arsenal that they depend on is necessary to continue its path into the 21st century. If 
the points in this study are not taken into account, the Department will see its purchasing 
power take a significant hit as the U.S. moves farther into the 21st century.  
 To be fair, the idea of military reform as a way to rein in military spending is not 
new in recent politics. Congress, the Executive branch, and academia have been trying to 
tackle this issue for years. One can trace the modern acquisition reform effort to the 
1960s and Robert McNamara’s reform process that brought the Department the well- 
known Planning, Programing, and Budget process. He saw this process as a way to 
quantify what the Department actually needed, and put acquisition in a mindset that 
didn’t just focus on procurement, but the full life of the system and put the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in change of the process.11 Fast-forward to the 1980s, Congress 
begins to seriously look at the defense spending and acquisition reform again with the 
creation of the Military Reform Caucus and the Packard Commission.12 Just as Sen. Gary 
Hart (D-CO) questioned if an increase in military spending would result in a safer 
America in the 1980s, President Trump is facing the same questions.13  
 Congress is also taking another deeper look at how to bring the defense 
procurement system into the 21st century. The Section 809 panel was created in the fiscal 
year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act. This panel, which is made up various 
                                                        
11 Grimes, Steven R. PPBS to PPBE: A Process Or Principles? Army War College, Carlisle Barracks: 
Defense Technical Information Center, 2008 
12 Hart, Gary. "An Agenda for More Military Reform." The New York Times, May 13, 1986. 
13 Daniel Wirls,  “Congress and the Politics of Military Reform,” Armed Forces & Society 17 1991: 487-
512 
 11 
subject matter experts and leaders in the field, is Congress’s reaction to yet another binge 
of concern about procurement cost and flexibility. The interim report focuses on big areas 
of concern, such as acquisition adaptability, complexity in the acquisition process, 
complex workplace regulations, and a changing industrial base.14 These are all needed 
changes, but like the attempts before the Panel, the recommendations will not stick unless 
the Department of Defense decides to make these changes. The Department has a history 
of success in overcoming massive technical hurdles to create the best qualitative force in 
the world today, but it also has a past littered with missteps. All the recommendations 
that the Section 809 panel is putting forward are correct. The Department of Defense 
should make it easier for business to work with it, the workforce does need reform, 
procurement needs to be less complex and more intuitive, but until mindsets change at 
the program levels, risky projects could still end up over budget and under producing. 
The following provides some of those changes, which need to part of the conversation if 
the Department of Defense and Congress want to control defense spending while keeping 
the qualitative edge it enjoys.  
 Finally, although this study looks at the how to change the system to continue to 
equip the force with the best materials and weaponry, one capability that is not addressed 
by the study but is vitally important to the success of the U.S. military in the past and into 
the future is training and manpower. The United States military is made up of 5 different 
branches with five distinct cultures. The United States Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, 
and Coast Guard all serve the U.S. in distinct fashions. The study addresses a small facet 
of military culture differences as it effects acquisition in its study of the Joint Tactical 
Radio System and the United States Marine Corps solution for a joint communications 
                                                        
14 Section 809 Panel Interim Report. Washington, DC: Section 809 Panel, 2017. 
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platform. The five service branches all serve to specialize in certain aspects of the 
mission to defend the United States, and with this comes differences in training, culture, 
and equipment needs. It is important that in any strategy moving forward, the United 
States Government and policy makers take into account the differences between service 
branches in future acquisitions15. Policy makers and leaders have even battled over the 
importance of training the force we have over increasing funding for manpower and 
weaponry acquisition. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley has even made the 
argument that it is critically important to increase readiness before increasing the size of 
the Army, because without ready troops to deploy, even the best strategy will not be 
effective. This study does not take this into account and is in no means a signal to ignore 




Entering the Global Stage: Development of the Modern Navy 
World War Two saw the world’s approach to military strategy and technology 
change.  Many have looked at World War Two as a significant turning point for how war 
was fought. Victor Davis Hanson, in his book, Carnage and Culture, Hanson examines 
the marquise battle of Midway, which was one of the largest aircraft carriers on carrier 
naval battle in history. He saw the ingenuity of the U.S. warfighter, and the use of carrier 
technology as a distinct mark of western dominance. Innovative command and 
                                                        
15 "Understanding Military Culture." Department of Veterans 
Affairs. https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/communityproviders/military_culture.asp. 
16 Dickstein, Corey. "Army: Increasing Combat Readiness More Important than Increasing Force 
Size." Stars and Stripes, June 7, 2017, 2017, sec. News. 
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individualism in tactical thinking marked the unique power that the U.S. brought to the 
field.17 Because of innovation like this, the U.S. fighting force transformation in World 
War Two is important to understand the U.S. transformation to its current military status. 
The U.S. was emerging from a significant economic downturn, faced depressed military 
budgets and a bridled military capacity because of international treaty obligations, and 
the U.S. political worldview was far more isolationist than it is today.  
Even with these challenges, World War Two saw a significant maturation and 
widespread use of carrier aviation in all theaters. The Japanese used carrier aviation to 
great effect at the beginning of the conflict, most notably in the attack on the U.S. Army 
and Navy bases in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Hanson argues that the Japanese had some of 
the most powerful and well-defended carriers of the time, but they did not make a 
dominant navy like the carrier did to the U.S. Navy. The U.S. made significant use of 
carrier based aviation in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, but most notably restructured 
the fleet around projection capabilities based in carrier aviation, and away from the 
traditional structure of concentrated firepower anchored by large capital ships. No longer 
was it necessary for opposing fleets to close within firing range, but they now had the 
ability to engage from blue water positions, in far beyond visual range battles. The U.S. 
was able to effectively harness and use carrier aviation, helping to pave the way to U.S. 
military dominance for decades. 
How did this happen? What did the United States do to restructure the fleet 
around carriers, and create such numerical advantages that these forces had resiliency in 
the face of an advanced enemy, like the Japanese. Even more, allies who had mastered 
                                                        
17 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Culture (New 
York: Anchor, 2003) 
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the technology, like the British, who invented the concept of the carrier, fell behind the 
U.S. One of the advantages the United States had on the rest of the participants in the war 
was a huge economy, which the government was attempting to mobilize in the wake of 
the great depression. The U. S. industrial base gave policy makers the tools to build a 
large navy. This coupled with the strategic considerations of the U.S. and the need to 
mobilize a large workforce made a strategic retooling and expansion of the U.S. Navy 
achievable and led to the ascent of the force to the top position in terms of global 
strength. More importantly, the U.S. Navy was able to adapt strategy effectively to meet 
the unique challenges of a global conflict. The Navy also was able to work with industry 
effectively to build and evolve capability.  
Naval Context prior to World War 2 
The United States Navy was built for major action and decisive engagement in the 
interwar period. With the aircraft carrier was in its infancy, the Navy’s primary focus was 
on firepower. Battle groups were built around large battleship formations, which could 
meet the enemy in a broadside assault. The idea would be to concentrate firepower from 
large capital ships to make the sum of the assault fatal to the composition of enemy fleet 
therefore rendering their firepower lost. Warplanes focused on “Major Tactics,”18 or the 
use of large fleet maneuvers to achieve objectives. The U.S. Navy planned specifically 
for a contingency in the Pacific, and created Plan Orange to prepare for war against 
Japan. This plan initially focused on large battle groups moving slowly across the Pacific 
achieving tactical objectives and being supplied by a long and potentially vulnerable 
logistics trains. Smaller surface combatants, trained in night search tactics, would seek 
                                                        
18 Trent Hone, “U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific,” Naval War College 
Review 62 (2009): 67-105. 
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out the enemy and prepare the opposing fleet for combat by inflicting damage prior to the 
staged battle. Aircraft carriers, an infant class of ship, would provide air cover for the 
main battle fleet, the logistics train, and aid in spotting the enemy.  The main offensive 
tool, which required smaller surface combatants to protect, was the battleship.19 
The five party treaties and subsequent modification significantly affected the 
composition of the major naval powers’ fleets until nullification. The initial agreement 
imposed strict numerical and tonnage restrictions on the Navies of France, Britain, Italy, 
the United States, and Japan in an effort to deescalate some of the tensions in the Pacific. 
Specifically, a 5-5-3 ratio governed the tonnage of American, British, and Japanese 
warships respectively.20  Pundits of the time saw this treaty as severely limiting for the 
United States, and allowed for advancement in shipbuilding outside of the U.S. Most 
fleets focused on heavy cruisers and speedier combatants to fill out their navy, while the 
U.S. had to cut back on certain innovations in naval architecture to comply with the 
treaty, especially the 5-5-3 rule, which dictated powers do not build a numerical 
advantage in ships.21 Naval powers did build aircraft carriers, but primary sources 
indicate there was much more of a focus on surface combatants.22 
Japan, Britain, and the United States led the pack in naval innovation. Britain was 
an established naval power; Japan was an enthusiastic observer in World War One, 
looking to build on the countries naval power proved earlier in the century; and the U.S. 
was grappling with an increasing role in the international security faced challenges. 
                                                        
19 Hone, Trent. "U.S. Navy Surface Battle Doctrine and Victory in the Pacific." Naval War College 
Review 62, no. 1 (Winter2009, 2009): 67-105. 
20 Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922-1923." Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922-1923 (01/11, 2009): 1. 
21 Ferraby, H. C. "EUROPE BUILDS NAVIES; EXPERT SAYS U.S. LAGS." Chicago Daily Tribune 
(1923-1963), Feb 07, 1927.  
22 Committee on Naval Affairs. United State House of Representatives. List of Combatant Ships Not 
Limited by Washington Treaty, 1928. 
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Britain’s Navy had challenges modernizing because of budgetary battles and institutional 
challenges. The Royal Navy, in 1918 had an established air corps that had been on the 
leading edge of aviation, incorporating land based bombers to fight against opposing 
ships and theorizing about the use of aircraft carrying ships, but lost significant headway 
due to budgetary issues and restructuring.23 The Royal Air Force (RAF), which was 
newly established after the First World War, absorbed all of the Royal Navy’s airmen. To 
build on this complication, the defense budgets were severely cut in the inter-war period, 
starving the services of needed modernization resources.24 General H.M. Trenchard, who 
was the head of the RAF and the Chief of the Air Staff, protected the infant RAF from 
budget and encroachment threats. His arguments convinced policymakers that the RAF 
should be the sole authority to design, build, and procure aircraft. He blocked both the 
Army and Navy’s efforts to take air assets from the service, and argued in favor of larger 
budgets for defense of the British Isle and not on imperial power projection, which carrier 
aviation embodied due to its expeditionary nature.25  This led to the Royal Navy only 
being able to focus on traditional combatant development, rather than innovation in 
tactics and doctrine. Starved of necessary financial resources and political backing, the 
Royal Navy developed traditional capabilities, and did not innovate.26 The Royal Navy 
also did not exploit gains. There was no true study of modern carrier aviation, and the 
carriers that the Royal Navy used focused on fleet defense and not projection. This can 
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also be partially attributed to the lack of control over plane design, limiting the Royal 
Navy to no specialized aircraft. 27 
The Japanese focused on developing and innovating carrier aviation. The Imperial 
Japanese Navy (IJN) successfully used aviation assets in 1914, launched off of converted 
cargo ships, to destroy a German outpost, and quickly understood the benefits and 
significance of this capability. The IJN worked with the British to westernize their air 
arm, subsidized industry research, and institutionalized education to develop strategy and 
tactics. The IJN followed the common theme of using carriers to defend fleets and reduce 
combat power of the enemy fleet through localized attacks, rather than spear assaults and 
project strike capability. To be clear, through a distinct campaign to educate, innovate, 
and fund carrier aviation, the IJN and Japan were able to build a strong service and 
capability.28 
U.S. Ship Building Before the War  
The capacity for U.S. shipbuilding played a vital role in the massive increase in the U.S. 
Navy’s combat power in the Second World War. The specialized shipyards needed to 
build a sophisticated Navy were not available in large numbers to the U.S. prior to the 
war. The U.S. had around 12 industrial shipyards active prior to the war.29 At its height, 
the U.S. shipbuilding industry during the war employed around two million direct and 
indirect employees to build a large and capable fleet. To achieve this, there was a rapid 
expansion of yard capacity and labor.30 
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This was not a new challenge to the United States. In World War One, the 
German Navy took a toll on allied shipping and there was an attempt by the U.S. to surge 
to build merchant and troop carrying ships to supply the Triple Entente in the war effort. 
While this never came to fruition because the war ended before these contracts could be 
delivered upon, the U.S. had experience in ramping up shipbuilding in response to a 
global conflict.31 
Industry in the United States had the necessary tools, but did not have the volume 
to meet such an increased need for ships. Most naval construction in the United States 
focused on building less complex ships such as barges and small cargo craft, and did not 
focus on the complex builds of ocean going steamships. The British naval industry was 
far and beyond the leader in advanced shipbuilding in the 1800s. In the late 1800s, the 
U.S. shipyards began retooling due to an increased demand for passenger ships and also 
an increase in spending from the U.S. government on naval power. Larger shipyards 
focused on adapting their production line to “Flexible Specialization,”32 meaning they 
invested in advanced machinery and skilled labor that could be put to the task building 
ships and integrating complex systems into the designs of new merchant and passenger 
ships.  This laid the foundation for being able to expand capacity to build much more 
advanced ship designs like destroyers, carriers, and other advanced ships, yet this 
capacity was still low at the eve of World War Two. This is mainly due to the fact the 
U.S. economy did not depend on a strong merchant fleet, as the British still maintained 
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the largest fleet at this time.33 The Washington Treaty also added to the woes of U.S. 
shipbuilding in the Inter-war period. Because the U.S. was unable, due to obligation, to 
construct warships larger then 10,000 tons, the big yards were forced to compete for the 
limited work, building at most heavy cruisers. This led to a closure of a few yards and the 
dispersal of the industrial base work force. Companies like Cramp & Sons struggled for 
work and closed their doors. This was of particular issue for the development of the 
industry, since this company had begun working in shipbuilding when wood was the 
predominate material, transitioned to iron, and then led in steel construction.34 New York 
Shipbuilding, Bethlehem Steel, and Newport News also tried to survive the desperate 
economic situation by creating an illegal cartel over bidding to syphon work to one 
another.35 
  The U.S. Navy and Congress scrambled to increase shipbuilding capacity when 
war seemed inevitable. This buildup was further reinforced by the U.S. Congress passage 
of the Two Ocean Navy Act, which authorized massive increases in the naval 
arsenal.36As U.S. Navy strategy dictated, a large fleet was needed quickly. Industry 
needed to rapidly expand and new shipyards opened up. These new shipyards, mainly 
managed by inexperienced staff and upper level management struggled to enter into the 
complex world of naval shipbuilding. Larger warships required significantly more 
complex building and engineering processes,  and yards needed to be experienced in 
armor, electronics, fire control, and weaponry to build successful vessels.  The newer 
companies could not necessarily provide these skills. In contrast the more advanced 
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shipyards could provide services and specialize in many difference types of ships. 
Newport News focused on building aircraft carriers, for example, leaving other ships to 
be dealt with by other shipyards. New York Shipyard, an experienced builder of heavy 
surface combatants, was able to adapt due to investments in flexible specialization. The 
first orders of the war, cruisers were able to change to carriers because engineering and 
labor could adapt and rework designs while still using the materials and tooling 
available.37 Industry’s flexibility in designing larger ships was helpful at the beginning, 
but excess capacity was needed in all types of shipbuilding. Heavy cruisers could take up 
to three years to construct, longer for bigger ships so construction slots were in high 
demand.38 The more green shipyards, which had capacity to build more than just simple 
cargo carriers, relied on mass production and batch construction methods to speed up 
production time.39 
Moreover, the economy and politics favored massive investment into heavy 
industries even prior to the war. Facing down the Great Depression, massive government 
spending seemed to the only solution out of the crisis. Industry was brought to a quick 
pace because of infrastructure projects. Concrete, steel, and other heavy manufacturing 
processes were needed to fulfill commitments for the Tennessee Valley Authority, the 
Conservation Corps, and others.40 Labor unions played a big role in the Administrations 
calculus at the time. When implementing major projects President Franklin Roosevelt 
worked to coopt labor into supporting his agenda. The American Federation of Laborers 
                                                        
37 Ibid., 275 
38 Klein, Maury. A Call to Arms : Mobilizing America for World War II. (New York: Bloomsbury Press,) 
2013. 
39 Heinrich, Thomas B. "Jack of all Trades: Cramp Shipbuilding, Mixed Production, and the Limits of 
Flexible Specialization in American Warship Construction, 1940-1945." Enterprise & Society (Oxford 
University Press / USA) 11, no. 2 (06/01, 2010): 275. 
40 Duncan, Thomas K. 1. and Christopher J. Coyne "The Origins of the Permanent War 
Economy." Independent Review 18, no. 2 (Fall 2013, 2013): 219-240.    
 21 
(AFL), a large labor organization was especially vital to appease, as it had large and 
skilled membership. 41 In 1932 the AFL proposed to support the maximum expenditure 
possible under naval treaty obligations at their national convention. The resolution, 
sponsored by the machinists unions did not pass, but it did help to set organized labor’s 
sights to shipbuilding as a source of government funded work. The AFL came out in 
support of a $300 million authorization to build Navy ships the next year.42  Labor helped 
to push for construction of new ships much more than industry did in the years before the 
war. The American body politic still had a sour taste in its mouth from World War One.  
The Congress had acted against these industrial players, who the public perceived as a 
reason for U.S. involvement in the First World War, by passing legislation curbing their 
profits in future defense programs.43 This simple fact made organized labor’s support of 
shipbuilding that more important. 
Two shipyards were vital in the creation and heavy manufacturing of aircraft 
carriers. Both Newport News and New York Shipbuilding, companies that had 
experience in building complex platforms, helped to fulfill the need for aircraft carriers. 
The New York Shipbuilding Company (NYS) opened its doors in the late 1800s and 
focused on building heavy ships. The company began building for the U.S. Navy in 1906, 
with a contract for cruisers.  Focusing on heavy machining and advanced manufacturing 
techniques, the company was able deliver ahead of schedule for its first government ship, 
solidifying its participation in U.S. Navy ship building.44 NYS then moved on to building 
capital ships for the U.S. Navy. During the Great War, NYS provided torpedo boats and 
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some merchant shipping capacity. Post Great War, NYS was tasked with building 
cruisers for the United States Navy. The Saratoga class cruiser, a planned fast attack 
heavy cruiser was then ordered to be converted into a fast attack carrier to comply with 
the tonnage limits under the Washington Treaty.45  
The Depression affected NYS as well. Lack of work and poor leadership led to 
the unions taking control of the yard and pressuring Washington to provide more work. 
This all changed when the U.S. Navy, in preparation for World War Two, started to lean 
on yards to revamp and rebuild. With the sharp increase in demand, the NYS shipyard 
alone employed 35,000 people and made a variety of surface combatants.46 The US Navy 
also relied on NYS to again change a cruiser design into a carrier. Because of its success 
with the previous conversion with the Saratoga Class cruisers in the 1920s, the US Navy 
commissioned the yard to build the Independence Class light carrier. This aircraft carrier 
again was built on the frame of a cruiser that the Navy forwent for more carrier capacity.  
 Newport News also played a significant role in building aircraft carriers for the 
United States Navy.  In 1933, Newport News was the first American Shipyard to be 
launch a purpose built aircraft carrier.47 The USS Ranger was the U.S. Navy’s first 
attempt to launch a real carrier.  Newport News was then contracted in 1938 to build the 
Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown, of the Yorktown Class of aircraft carriers. These 
carriers made it to the fleet and join in the Battle of Midway, where the U.S. was able to 
seize the initiative of the war.  The Company made further progress when they launched 
the Essex Class of carriers. The Newport News Shipyard built the first few of this class.48 
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Aircraft Carriers in the U.S. War Effort  
The United States entered the war with a limited navy. The 5-5-3 agreements from the 
Washington Treaty dictated smaller ship builds. The U.S. built its first carrier in 1922, 
but utilized converted ships rather than purpose building carriers. These ships mainly to 
provide for fleet reconnaissance and fire control. 49 The first aircraft carriers launched 
scout aircraft.50 These aircraft carriers were developed under the constraints of the 
Washington Treaty and came in at under 20,000 tons, relatively small.51  
 The U.S. Navy had to innovate to get to the position it was in the late stages of the 
war. As previously mentioned, the U.S. had no specific built carrier meant for decisive 
battle or fast attack concept as it was not developed at the time of the first carrier orders. 
The Navy used the pre-World War Two concept of the carriers providing protection and 
spotting. The carrier was brought to the forefront after the U.S. fleet of heavy battleships 
was heavily damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor.  The small fleet of carriers available 
to Navy leadership was used to directly respond to the Japanese attack, starting with 
launching a raid on Tokyo itself. This is not to say that battleships and heavy cruisers 
were irrelevant after Pearl Harbor, as shipyards continued to produce them into the war.52 
Doctrine existed that placed the carrier in an air superiority role, but still in defensive 
type nature. Over the next few years of the conflict and as dictated by need, the carrier 
evolved as the Navy experimented with innovative techniques. By 1945 the U.S. aircraft 
carrier was filling in rolls covering amphibious operation, hunting and destroying the 
fleet, and escorting shipping. The carrier and Naval leadership was able to use after 
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action reviews and innovative doctrine and war gamming to create a lethal and flexible 
force. 53 
 Specifically up until 1943, carrier doctrine was similar to that of the battleship. 
They were used for ambush, reconnaissance, and amphibious support. They also played a 
critical role in protection of bases and fleets. The plans were to keep them grouped 
tightly, for ease of defense, and usually leave them within range of friendly airfields and 
battle groups to layer their protection. This presented problems for the Navy as it limited 
the carriers’ mobility and hampered their effectiveness against the opposing fleets. In 
1942, leaders realized that doctrine needed to change to allow carriers to operate more 
freely and change to a sound and specific doctrine governing the implementation of 
carriers. Admiral Chester Nimitz and his team were able to begin experimenting with 
new roles for carriers when the light Independence Class carriers, built by the New York 
Shipbuilding,54 and some of the larger class carriers like the Essex, Yorktown, and, 
Lexington came online, which were built by Newport News55. These new ships 
integrated new technologies and management methods to make the most out of new 
technology. Aircraft had identify friend or foe (IFF) technology moving into this time as 
well. With the new air search, surface search, and ship to plane communications suites, 
the air wings and carriers were much more effective at directing and interdicting on 
threats and targets.56 
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 This new technology, coupled with some of the Navy’s best minds, allowed for 
experimentation in new techniques and formations. At the same time, escort ships 
experimented with new ways to screen aircraft carriers from enemy submarines.  What 
developed was a new doctrine for a mobile carrier task force, reliant on speed, to attack 
the enemy. Known as PAC-10, the fast attack concept of using Essex class carriers and 
Independence class carriers in groups of four made up by two types each.57 The 
Independence Class carriers would provide fleet protection while the Essex class carriers 
would provide strike packages. The new air and surface search radars would also allow 
for night operations. PAC-10 provided for a common operation doctrine, desperately 
needed for the carrier forces, and the speed of the group allowed for quick strikes, which 
off put the Japanese, who were beginning to sustain operation-disrupting casualties in the 
fleet.  Through 1944, the fleet capitalized on opportunities like the battle at Wake Island 
and other fights to test and refine the battle doctrine, working technological issues out 
and streamlining procedures. The Independence class carriers also refined their Combat 
Air Patrol capability to provide expert coverage and air superiority over the fleet during 
all types of operations. The operation tempo and effectiveness of the fast attack fleets 
increased and the lethality of these forces and groups. The industrial base was also able to 
provide the fleet with a significant influx of equipment and ships to support the growing 
fleet. This coupled with the effectiveness of the doctrine created a combine naval combat 
power that was revolutionary in use of naval air and surface assets.58 Specifically up until 
1943, carrier doctrine was similar to that of the battleship. They were used for ambush, 
reconnaissance, and amphibious support. They also played a critical role in protection of 




bases and fleets. The plans were to keep them grouped tightly, for ease of defense, and 
usually leave them within range of friendly airfields and battle groups to layer their 
protection. This presented problems for the Navy as it limited the carrier’s mobility and 
hampered their effectiveness against the opposing fleets. In 1942, leaders realized that 
doctrine needed to change to allow carriers to operate more freely and change to a sound 
and specific doctrine governing the implementation of carriers. Admiral Chester Nimitz 
and his team were able to begin experimenting with new roles for carriers when the light 
Independence Class carriers, built by the New York Shipbuilding,59 and some of the 
larger class carriers like the Essex, Yorktown, and, Lexington came online, which were 
built by Newport News1. These new ships integrated new technologies and management 
methods to make the most out of new technology. Aircraft had identify friend or foe 
(IFF) technology moving into this time as well. With the new air search, surface search, 
and ship to plane communications suites, the air wings and carriers were much more 
effective at directing and interdicting on threats and targets.60 
 This new technology, coupled with some of the Navy’s best minds, allowed for 
experimentation in new techniques and formations. At the same time, escort ships 
experimented with new ways to screen aircraft carriers from enemy submarines. What 
developed was a new doctrine for a mobile carrier task force, reliant on speed, to attack 
the enemy. Known as PAC-10, the fast attack concept of using Essex class carriers and 
Independence class carriers in groups of four made up by two types each.1 The 
Independence Class carriers would provided fleet protection while the Essex class 
carriers would provide strike packages. The new air and surface search radars would also 
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allow for night operations. PAC-10 provided for a common operation doctrine, 
desperately needed for the carrier forces, and the speed of the group allowed for quick 
strikes, which off put the Japanese, who were beginning to sustain operation-disrupting 
casualties in the fleet.  Through 1944, the fleet used opportunities like the battle at Wake 
Island and other fights to test and refine the battle doctrine, working technological issues 
out and streamlining procedures. The independence class carriers also refined their 
combat air patrol capability to provide fleet air coverage to allow for the Essex Class air 
wings to operate strike packages more efficiently. The use of sensor suites, 
communications equipment, and state of the art aviation equipment enabled the fighter 
and bomber aircraft to operate with a lower issue rate as well.61 
Policy and Strategy  
 An increase in the United States Navy was generally supported as war drew 
closer, but, even before the need for wartime increases, the U.S. political and security 
dialogue was focused on the weak state of the United State Navy. President Roosevelt, 
who was an Under Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson,62 took office 
in 1932 and shortly after began acting on recommendations from the U.S. Navy issued 
recommendations to significantly increase the number of surface combatants deployed by 
the Navy. Shortly after this report was issued, the Congress appropriated monies to build 
destroyers, carriers, and other surface combatants. This money was part of a larger 
omnibus package aimed at revitalizing industry and providing jobs, but started industry 
working on Naval assets.63  Congress was also a driver of this increase. The Trammel-
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Vinson Act authorized ship building in the Navy to replace old ships and build the U.S. 
Navy to full strength.  At the time, the U.S. had restrictions on what it could build and the 
tonnage of ships, but the U.S. did not even build up to this limit; the Act changed that and 
authorized a build to the level, although it did not fund it.64 Actual appropriations to build 
ships of the fleet would come in separate appropriations.65 The authorization provided the 
Navy and Congress extreme flexibility in increasing the size of the Navy. As the threat of 
war continued to grow, the Congress passed the Naval Expansion Act of 1938, which 
authorized an across the board 20 percent increase in U.S. Navy combat power.66 The 
shipbuilding strategy was continued with the passage and signing of the Two-Ocean 
Navy Act, which authorized a 70 percent increase in Navy Combat power in 1940. Of 
larger significance, this act finally gave the U.S. Navy truly offensive capabilities. In 
testimony before the Naval Affairs Committee, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Harold Stark submitted a plan, which would drastically increase the offensive capability 
of the surface fleet, and included 18 aircraft carriers.67 
How did the carrier affect U.S. Navy doctrine, and why so successful? 
The aircraft carrier was a new weapon in the arsenal of the modern navy and 
World War Two was the proving ground. Navies had success with the carrier in World 
War One and had built and war gamed with them enough to understand their potential in 
combat but that view was limited. The Japanese were able to innovate with carriers and 
launch a successful carrier raid that almost crippled the U.S. fleet, but they were not able 
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to sustain the program. The British, who were leaders in naval aviation during the Great 
War, did not continue the trend and did not place a priority on expanding naval aviation 
as the political discourse in the interwar period saw it as inherently colonial and 
expansionary, therefore not a cogent use of money.  The island nation also faced a 
political game between services and a diversion of resources from building naval aviation 
capability, instead focusing on    
Through necessity, innovation, and capacity, the United States was able to 
experiment with the aircraft carrier to make the most innovative solution and strategy to 
employ the weapon. Evidenced by the political and industrial support for naval expansion 
and shipbuilding, the U.S. Navy’s ambition to best employ the aircraft carrier was 
supported by the U.S. Although it may seem that the aircraft carrier was an expensive 
project that shipyards pushed for to increase revenue, but with the volume of ships being 
produced and the drastic need for the U.S. Navy to bolster existing and open new yards to 
increase capacity, the evidence does not point to industrial and political design. The 
narrative of the aircraft carrier and the U.S. Navy is one of innovation and adaptation. 
Industry and Congress may have had a significant part in making it possible, but the U.S. 
Navy evolved a cogent strategy and doctrine to make use of the advanced weapon 
systems that the industrial base, expanded by the service, made possible.  
  
Chapter 2 
Pursuit of Excellence: A Revolution in Military Affairs? 
 
Moving to today and more generally the post-Cold War era, the U.S. is facing a 
unique but not unseen challenge posed by changing international economics, 
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technological capacity, and availability of information. Technology is changing at a rapid 
pace and bringing new concepts and tactics into the realm of possibility. The environment 
has many similarities to the early twentieth century in this regard, just as explained in the 
previous section. Other international allies and adversaries are figuring out how to use 
and integrate this technology into their tactics, strategy, and overall geopolitical strategy. 
The main difference is that the United States is entering this period at the top of the 
spectrum, in terms of power. Similar to the United Kingdom in the early twentieth 
century, the United States faces multiple threats to its technological primacy and must 
efficiently move into the future to maintain the edge. 
 The United States is facing the proliferation of commercial technology to 
adversaries, a resurgent class of near-peer competitors, asymmetric threats, rogue states, 
and historically lower defense budgets. Yet, it appears, in certain criteria, the U.S. 
military continues to hamstring itself by pursuing revolutionary changes in doctrine and 
technology, often at too fast a pace. Looking at the early 2000s, it is clear the U.S. 
military was affected by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), as laid out by Joint 
Vision 2010.  The biggest  question about the RMA is, did it bring about effective change 
or did it make the U.S. pursue technologies that did not produce the benefits expected? 
The Joint Tactical Radio System provides a strong case study, which exemplifies a larger 
trend of programs that cost significant investment but did not perform as intended. The 
Joint Tactical Radio System program intended to launch the U.S. military into the 21st 
century battlefield with new capabilities and technology to allow for the revision of 
doctrine.  The data throughout points RMA that brought the U.S. military added 
technology, especially when it came to networked capabilities, but the Joint Tactical 
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Radio System study shows that the military is best served by slowly and incrementally 
approaching these changes. Slow and steady change is a risk adverse way of identifying 
the solution, and in this fiscal and security environment, the U.S. military needs to 
maintain an aversion to unnecessary development risk. Although certain aspects of the 
Joint Tactical Radio System survived, the process to create the all-in-one radio proved to 
diminish precious time and resources, with the services needing to adapt as conflict arose 
and development failures mounted. The U.S. needs to approach these large technical 
leaps with caution, but it is necessary to push the boundaries of technology to achieve 
change. 
The Information Battlefield  
 In March of 2003, U.S. forces were racing through Iraq. Small and agile, these 
forces brought a high degree of technical power to communicate and coordinated with 
one another, maintain full situational awareness, and collect and disseminate valuable 
intelligence on the enemy’s movements and activities. This tech heavy force entered Iraq 
being able to track all of their units through the newly introduced blue force tracker and 
other new, unproven technology. Their convoys were supposed to maintain connectivity 
to their commanders sitting in the military command posts, and the individual soldier 
would be empowered to email and text other troops across the battlefield. This concept 
grew out of changes to the military concepts, tactics, and strategy after failures to 
communicate and maneuver in the first gulf war, and a reorganization of the military 
started during the demise of the Soviet Union.68 These new systems were well practiced 
on paper, but caused issue with U.S. troops who took them to war.69 
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The U.S. military was undergoing a massive change in the character of its 
institutions and operations at the close of the Cold War. Through the change of the 
security environment, lessons learned, and the geo-political landscape, the U.S. military 
understood it needed to continue to evolve into a joint, coordinated force.   The 
Department of Defense commissioned studies to see how the U.S. would fight under this 
construct as well. In 1994 and 1995 Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratory 
sponsored the Joint Warfare Requirements Study at the request of the Department of 
Defense, to examine the viability of the Joint Concept.70 The concept of Joint Operations 
first appeared in 1986, with the Department of Defense’s reorganization under 
Goldwater-Nichols, which emphasized reduction of redundancy and operational 
streamlining.  
Throughout the last two decades, controversy has swirled around the U.S. use of 
military force in Iraq and Afghanistan and the impact of the Rumsfeld doctrine on the 
success of U.S. operations. In 2002 Donald Rumsfeld wrote an article, “Transforming the 
Military,” which was published in Foreign Affairs and laid out his Rumsfeld Doctrine. 
Secretary Rumsfeld argues that a revolution in military technology and strategy will 
allow for the U.S. to operate with a smaller footprint and improved lethality.71 His article 
largely reinforced the Bush Administration’s belief that warfare was evolving into an 
environment that requires small footprints of highly networked troops, which would act 
as a force multiplier. The Bush Administration adamantly believed this was the way to 
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propel the U.S. security apparatus into the 21st century, and made it an important part of 
the campaign.72 
Rumsfeld’s vision was not revolutionary. The Department of Defense was 
undergoing a repurposing after the fall of the Soviet Union and needed to reorganize 
around lessons learned in the first Gulf War, where the inability to re-task and effectively 
maintain constant communication affected the speed of the advance into Iraq and 
destruction of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The idea for the network centric warfare developed 
from a notion of multiple systems working together.  In Admiral William Owens’ piece 
The Emerging U.S. Systems of Systems, the Vice Chairman explains how the U.S. 
military is experienced in three fundamental changes, which he calls revolutions. He 
posits the U.S. military is moving forward due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of the unipolar world, the shrinking defense budgets, and a RMA.73 To 
Admiral Owens, the coming revolution will bring upon huge advances in military 
sensing, communications, and application of force. These systems of systems will allow 
the U.S. military to enjoy situational-awareness unencumbered by the fog of war and lack 
of communication.74 
Joint Vision 2010 
Joint Vision 2010 is a strategic document that mapped out the route for the armed 
forces and the United States security apparatus post-Cold War. The threat and geo-
political environment was changing, and the U.S. military leaders needed to plan for the 
emergence of asymmetric threats and rogue nations, which would threaten the world 
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order.75  U.S. military leaders, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned these threats, and 
saw six core concepts needed to combat and maintain the global order. Joint Vision 2010 
saw the need for all services of the military to work together in a joint fashion and 
achieve “full spectrum dominance”76 on the battlefield of the 21st century. The six core 
concepts, or “critical elements”77 the U.S. military were to pursue the joint operating 
concept were people, leadership, doctrine, education, training, organizational structure, 
and material.78 The Joint Vision assessed the viabilities, challenges, and achievements of 
each of these categories, but overall the Joint Vision pushed for what people within the 
Department of Defense referred to as network-centric warfare. The U.S. military, in a 
joint capacity, would use technology to focus communications, logistics, and force 
protection to a level never seen before.79 The Joint Vision 2010 document was seen as a 
necessary part to avoid a major conflict in the future and to maintain U.S. dominance in a 
uni-polar world. Military thinkers saw the times pointing to a Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) that the U.S. needed to realize, or fade into obscurity. Thinkers posed this 
period as pivotal as the change in technology change, which lead to the carnage of the 
Great War. The U.S. stood the chance to fall to a new power if it did not meet and exceed 
the threat environment, which was developing after the Cold War.80 
 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA) 
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One of the key tenets pushing the idea that the Department of Defense needed to 
reform was the idea that the 21st century was ushering in a revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). With the increase in technology and advances in consumer products and 
communications, military leaders sought to take advantage of the changes and create a 
new concept for the U.S. Armed Forces.  
Many authors have investigated the idea of the RMA in the post-Cold War era.. 
Andrew Marshall, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Department of 
Defense gives a useful definition of RMA for this paper’s purpose. He posited that an 
RMA is “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative 
application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military 
doctrine and organizational and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character 
and conduct of military operations.”81 The theory behind RMA as defined by Prezelj, 
Kopac, Ziberna, Kolak, and Grizold in their piece “Evolutionary Reality in Revolution in 
Military Affairs: Results of a Comparative Study” is “Discontinuous, radical, non-
incremental, and even disruptive change”82 to military technology, doctrine, and strategy. 
These scholars argue that RMA is not necessarily a quick and disjointed change, but has 
more of an evolutionary process to the change. The authors of the study studied dozens of 
militaries that sought to reformat in the 1990s and found that fewer than ten percent of 
them actually experienced revolutionary change in the five-year study period.83 
 Their piece brings up a split in the school of thought that tries to explain how 
militaries modernize and adapt to the new battlefield. On one side there is the idea that 
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militaries evolve to changing circumstances, such as the theory laid forward in 
“Evolutionary Reality in Revolution in Military Affairs: Results of a Comparative 
Study.”  The authors took a comparative look at many militaries, focusing on Eastern 
European militaries emerging from the Cold War. They examined 33 countries that 
attempted to grapple with modernizing their military for a modern security environment, 
and only found that a mere 2% of the countries armed forces studies were able to achieve 
revolutionary change, and of that small percentage, only a small amount of revolutionary 
change was achieved. They argue overall that most change is achieved through natural 
evolution, and is a smoother transition than the fractious revolutions in doctrine that 
revolutionary thinkers see as normal.84 
 Teodor Frunzenti explains in his article, “Content and Dynamics of the Current 
Revolution in Military Affairs,” how RMAs differ from military revolutions, as RMAs 
are specifically focused changes on the military balance in regions and with military. He 
views changes in military technology such as the invention of gunpowder as fundamental 
military revolutions as they altered the geopolitical landscape of great power conflicts 
and how societies work. He believes that, over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries, 
there have been multiple RMAs resulting in the change in respective regions military 
balances.85 
Ofer Fridman takes a different tact in defining RMAs. In his piece “Revolutions 
in Military Affairs that did not occur,” he examines how RMAs come about.  Fridman 
cites the trend of literature explaining the phenomena of RMAs. Ofer Fridman sees that 
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RMAs, while not always successful, are a combination of political, technological, and 
military developments, which come together to form a change of how country’s 
military’s do business. Fridman sees these transformations as a slow moving evolutionary 
process. Through case studies, he proves how militaries move slowly through the correct 
circumstances.86 
Retired Army officer Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr, in his piece titled, “The Evolution 
in Military Affairs: Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces,” dives into the specifics of a 
RMA versus an Evolution in Military Affairs and examines the U.S. military as it resets 
for the post-cold war era. Through the use of qualitative and quantitative evidence, 
Lovelace argues, the U.S. military adapts to new security challenges through evolution, 
not revolution. Specifically, Lovelace sees an evolution as allowing for small changes to 
respond to the transient nature of the post cold war security environment.87  
A critical area missing in this research is how the pursuit of this revolution helped 
or hurt the U.S. military’s ability to advance into a new doctrine to meet new security 
threats. In a political environment marred by stagnation and gridlock, and a budget 
uncertainty that harms the U.S. services, how has the reorganization helped or hurt? Did 
technological research help to propel the services forward to reach the potential of an 
RMA or just distract from critical linear evolutions in military science and technology.? 
How do you benchmark RMA progress?  It’s not a singularly agreed upon 
method, as noted in the literature above, but technological development and how it 
affected the course of conflict is common denominator. This paper will critically examine 
                                                        
86 Fridman, Ofer. "Revolutions in Military Affairs that did Not Occur: A Framework for Analysis." 
Comparative Strategy 35.5 (2016): 388. Print. 
87 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. "The Evolution in Military Affairs: Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces " 
Strategic Studies Institute (1997)Print. 
 38 
whether the Joint Tactical Radio System helped to advance future concepts of networked 
war, or if the Joint Tactical Radio System delayed critical fielding of evolutionary 
military technology. The paper will seek to examine scholarly works, acquisition 
documents, and government oversight reports, and contextually appropriate media reports 
with the objective to create a picture of how the program progressed, what went wrong, 
how it responded to warfighter needs, and, after the program was changed or restructured, 
if any of the technology or aspects of the program survived in future acquisition 
programs. The programs were Army led, but stood to change the doctrine of the entire 
U.S. military and represented an attempt to break weapon and support systems out of the 
traditional model used by the armed forces in during the Cold War period. This  program 
began during the late 90s and early 2000s, representing acquisition and research 
examples of what scholars and leaders believed would be needed for the future national 
security environment.  
 
Joint Tactical Radio System progression  
 The Joint Tactical Radio System was one of the big, keystone programs meant to 
propel the U.S. military into the 21st century. This program would allow for units to 
communicate with one another with ease and increase the amount of data to increase 
situational awareness. All of this would be necessary to meet the demands of Joint Vision 
2010 and the force of the 21st century. The program, while innovative, was mismanaged 
and because of administrative as well as technical challenges, progress toward a joint 
radio was slow 
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The Joint Tactical Radio System began in the mid 1990s as an attempt to reduce 
the number of different communications systems used in the United States military.88 The 
Army wanted to be able to operate and revise plans during an operation, which was a 
limiting factor in the Gulf War.89 Before the origination of the program, each service had 
their own communications solution, creating 25 to 30 separate systems that did not 
interoperate.90 The military believed the Joint Tactical Radio System, which would 
introduce commonality and reduce soldier workload, would only require 300,000 radios 
for the entire Armed Forces enterprise, rather than the over 700,000 they were using at 
the time.91 The system was based on an idea of a networked, software-defined radio, 
which could communicate over multiple different frequencies and waveforms. The 
system would also be compatible with the U.S. legacy systems and certain close allies, 
who operate with the United States.92 Joint Tactical Radio System was an integral part of 
expanding the Global Information Grid, and an enabler for a network-centric concept of 
operations the Department of Defense was shifting towards.93  The program was spread 
across five separate platforms, led by separate services. Those five areas were Ground 
Vehicle and Helicopters, Hand Held Radio, Fixed Site and Maritime Radios, High 
Performance Aircraft, and Handheld, Dismounted Small Form Factor Radios. The U.S. 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations Command would develop these 
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systems simultaneously.94 All of these software-defined radios would be designed to 
work with the Army’s Future Combat System (appearing later in this article) and act as 
an enabling system for the networked concept of the system.95 
 After the Army completed significant tests to prove the concept of Joint Tactical 
Radio System, the Department of Defense gave Boeing a two million dollar contract for 
the initial steps in the program.96 Boeing embarked on creating one radio to answer the 
Army’s call for a comprehensive solution. This program began hitting technological 
issues, as the over 30 waveforms the Joint Tactical Radio System was supposed to handle 
and process all required different technological answers and there were physical barriers 
to incorporating them into one, compact design.97 The Department of Defense 
reorganized the program multiple times in an attempt to rein in costs and increase 
oversight. The most significantly change was the division of the systems before 2004. 
This allowed for more defense contractors to enter the competition, increasing 
competition, but the problems still continued. Of particular concern was the Ground 
Mobile Radio (GMR). The GMR and a smaller version for individual troops were 
supposed to be small enough to be incorporated into a tactical link to far off assets.98 In 
2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report addressing the 
technological challenges that were causing delays and cost over-runs, some of which 
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breached Nunn-McCurdy.99 Specifically the GAO cited the weight and power 
requirements as being some of the biggest issue with the program. The Joint Tactical 
Radio System, which was going to be incorporated into the Future Combat System, a 
proposed new family of ground combat vehicles, needed to hit specific weight and power 
requirements to work with the program. Specifically, the FCS underwent a significant 
weight reduction to work with tactical transports meaning the Joint Tactical Radio 
System needed to weigh less. With the size, weight, and power consumption exceeding 
requirements, the FCS and Joint Tactical Radio System would need a redesign to fit into 
the force.100 Boeing continued to struggle to build the GMR, one of the 5 parts of the 
program, which was having the most trouble. The GMR that they did develop tipped the 
scales at over 200 pounds and took significant time to warm up, transmit, and decipher 
messages, which is not well suited for combat situations.101 In 2011, the Obama 
Administration cancelled the biggest aspect of Joint Tactical Radio System, the GMR, 
citing cost overruns and technological challenges.102  
Warfighter Need and Response 
It was clear the U.S. Military needed to change the way they communicated 
during operations. During the first Gulf War, exercises, and training, units still faced had 
limited abilities to communicate. This meant that plans were always static, targets could 
not be updated, and the fog and friction of war was greater than commanders wanted. In 
                                                        
99 Arena, Mark, and Irv Buckstein et. al. Department of Defense and Commercial Advanced Waveform 
Developments and Programs with Multiple Nunn-McCurdy Breaches. MG1171z5 Vol. Rand Corporation, 
2014. 
100 Government Accountability Office. Defense Acquisitions: Resolving Development Risks in the Army's 
Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to Fielding Future Force. GAO-05-669 Vol. Government 
Accountability Office, 2005. 
101 Gallagher, Sean. "How to Blow $6 Billion on a Tech Project: Military's 15 Year Quest for the Perfect 
Radio is a Blueprint for Failing Big." ARS Technica: Technology Lab 6/18/2012 2012. 
102 Bloomberg News. "Department of Defense Axes Ground Mobile Radio Portion of JTRS 
Program." Defense Systems Oct 17, 2011 2011Print.l 
 42 
theory, a radio like the Joint Tactical Radio System would largely solve this problem. 
Moreover, the U.S. military did not have the luxury of time when developing this system. 
The U.S. military engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan a few short years after the 
start of this program and needed solutions fast. The new advanced way of communication 
was not ready for operational use when the U.S. military deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The concept behind Joint Tactical Radio System, the net-centric war, did 
not have legs to keep up with the quick pace of operations. The U.S. deployed troops 
with untested technologies and left critical gaps in ISR and intelligence capabilities, 
which theoretically should have been addressed with the new suites available to the war 
fighter. Mechanized units left their staging areas with tracking devices, unparalleled 
satellite coverage, electronic eavesdropping capabilities, and connectivity. It was all too 
common, especially in the beginning of the Iraq war, when large formations raced across 
the desert, for these systems to fail and leave soldiers to depend on traditional tactics or 
worse leave them vulnerable because they tried to utilize the revolutionary technology. 
103 Services needed to flex and buy radios to fill the gap that the Joint Tactical Radio 
System left as it did not meet its schedule while still providing some technical solutions. 
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has needed the help of competitors to the 
Joint Tactical Radio System and the GMR system specifically to fill the communications 
gap. Harris Corporation became a stalwart in the urgent supply of radios, which could 
operate in multiple wavelengths. The AN-117G, which can be bought for a fraction of the 
cost of the Joint Tactical Radio System GMR, proved to be a soldier preferred radio, in 
which the military spent millions of dollars procuring on top of the GMR systems. Other 
rivals to the Joint Tactical Radio System provide solutions at a fraction of the costs, while 
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providing largely similar capabilities.. One major issue with this approach though is the 
radios do not contain open architecture and the 117G radio’s main waveform is Harris 
Corporation proprietary technology. Although the Harris 117G radio can work with some 
of the older, joint wavelengths, the radios wavelength limited what systems it was 
compatible with..104 Harris offered to license the wavelength to the U.S. government for 
defense use, but that never moved forward.105 
The Joint Tactical Radio System ultimately restructured into Joint Program 
Executive Office (JPEO) Joint Tactical Radio System, with only three technologies, the 
AMF, HMS, and MIDS system surviving. More importantly the Joint Tactical Radio 
System network domain survived to be renamed to the Joint Tactical Networks Program 
(JTNC). This domain is critical for advancing the U.S. military’s vision of future 
communication, as it will support secure, interoperable wavelengths, which the 
warfighter can use with commercial and military solutions.106  
Use of Benchmark Technology 
The concepts that the Joint Tactical Radio program developed were useful as 
stated above, interim solutions used the technology and theory behind open architecture 
and integration of multiple wavelengths for military communications.  Services used 
these concepts and discoveries provided by the program to build new networks. 
An interesting study is the United States Marine Corps experience with a next 
generation communication system. Faced with the same communications problem, the 
service embarked on an in-house campaign to find a solution. What the USMC came up 
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with was CONDOR.  The Marine Corps introduced this system around 2005. They 
needed a technology that could operate as a bridge between old and new technology 
while they were equipping with new systems. Through their own research and 
development they produced a system that satisfied certain requirements of future 
communications needs and was a useable solution.  Better yet, the USMC used existing 
off the shelf technology to complete the project.107 
The Marine Corps also used commercial technology to meet their 
communications needs. The Marines experimented with and ultimately used the Iridium 
communication network to enable troops to communicate over a long range and in an 
encrypted fashion. The program eventually yielded the Distributed Tactical 
Communications Systems (DCTS), which gave troops a push-talk ability, a 250-mile 
coverage, secured networks, and gave the ability for multiple users to interact on the 
same channels and wavelength. This allowed for theater wide communications, real time 
distribution of data and empowerment of sensor suits, and increase in effectiveness for 
ground troops.108  
Did pursuit of revolutionary technology harm immediate need? 
The Iraq War in 2003 was the first large scale ground operation taken in a long 
established post cold war era. The Department of Defense was apt to use their new-
networked war doctrine and technology to prove that the RMA they had pursued 
produced real tactical and strategic advantages. 109 The Joint Tactical Radio System was 
important to this concept, as it would provide the technical practice to the concept, but as 
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provided above, the program did not develop as quickly as needed. The military had to 
rely on commercial technology and service innovation to bridge the gap and meet the 
need of the war fighter. This propelled the Department of Defense forward and helped the 
warfighter meet the new challenge facing them on the battlefield. 
The network centric war that the Department of Defense pursued because of Joint 
Vision 2010 did in fact develop, although programs such as Joint Tactical Radio System 
did hold the military back due to the programs issues. Joint Vision 2010 did predict a 
RMA.  The proliferation of communications technologies leveled the playing field and 
allowed non-state and proto-state actors to threaten U.S. military dominance. In Iraq, 
small cells of terrorists and anti-U.S. militia forces were able to significantly affect U.S. 
operations in the region and require the U.S. military to make alternate plans of 
operations and pursue alternate technologies. This was all happening while the Joint 
Tactical Radio System program experienced significant delays.  
The software defined radio and open architecture systems that Joint Tactical 
Radio System helped to develop and spur are key to the future of the United States 
military, and the partial failure of the Joint Tactical Radio System  was key to creating 
these technologies. The University of Maryland, on a partial grant from the Naval Post 
Graduate School, evaluated the Joint Tactical Radio System and pointed out how the 
restructurings taught the U.S. military some important lessons. Mainly, the program 
pointed out that planning, evolution, industry competition, and acceptance of partial 
solutions to requirements rather than forces technically infeasible solutions on to industry 
can be beneficial to overseeing successful programs.110  
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The Department of Defense is now pursuing a change in culture to bring about 
open architecture and system interoperability to allow for a more agile force. Instead of 
continuing to work with contractors who usually end up owning the rights to the systems 
and all follow on development, the U.S. military is looking for solutions that are more 
modular, and fit together with families and systems of systems.111 The closed mindset of 
the previous decades created the problems Joint Tactical Radio System sought to fix. The 
U.S. military is now pursuing policies to make sure that same issue of system 
incompatibility does not happen again. 
Looking back to 1997, U.S. military leaders were correct in predicting a need for 
a systems of systems approach. They saw the threat and the challenges ahead, which was 
a largely accurate assessment, and realized what actions needed to be taken to fix the way 
forward. Joint Tactical Radio System exhibits the U.S. military’s response to a need for 
new technology, and after reviewing the evidence, it is a necessary program to spur 
change. Joint Vision 2010 did Open architectures, software defined radios, and families 
of systems. More broadly, the failure of the Joint Tactical Radio System did lead to 
important lessons learned in how to acquire and develop technology in the 21st century. 
The military had to think around the problem, which led to the USMC reworking the 
Iridium network and changing how they conducted ground communications, and the U.S. 
military as a whole needed to work with other industry to integrate radio systems that did 
not satisfy all of the goals the Joint Tactical Radio System program set out for. These 
adaptations proved the benefits of flexibility in a developing technological landscape.   
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Chapter 3 
Modern Acquisition and Cost Efficiencies  
Taking the lessons from the previous examples, the Department of Defense has to 
face down fiscal and technological challenges. The political and fiscal environment is not 
as favorable to support unjustified military spending. Realizing that Congress just 
debated and passed military spending legislation at historic levels, the extra funding will 
not be sustained and Congress can change their path in spending.   Every dollar counts in 
this fiscal environment. At the same time the United States is facing unprecedented 
threats across the globe ranging from state actors like Russia and China who want to 
reassert themselves while disturbing the rules based order the U.S. and allies created post 
World War Two. China and Russia are angling to do this by projecting power in their 
regions and muscling the United States out. On the other end of the spectrum, the United 
States is faced with low intensity conflicts from violent non-state actors, such as ISIS and 
Al-Qaeda, which pose a challenge into the future. Within this, the U.S. Department of 
Defense needs to continue to pursue modernization policies that maintain their 
dominance over the entire spectrum of threats. The 3+2 strategy that the Trump 
administration proposed in the National Defense Strategy will require a large spectrum of 
capabilities, all of them costing precious resources. With major defense acquisition 
programs like the F-35, CVN-79, and many calling into question Defense spending and 
focusing the modernization debate around programs that are continually over budget, 
delayed, and underperforming, the Department of Defense needs to reexamine its 
acquisition procedures. Congress, playing its traditional role as overseer, is trying to 
implement some of the most monumental changes to the Department of Defense’s 
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internal acquisition process, but services also need to reexamine how the ‘innovate.’ This 
section seeks to examine the services ideas on innovation while controlling costs. The 
critical question needing to be answered is ‘How can the Department of Defense continue 
to innovate and field superior weapons systems while maintaining predictability in cost 
and delivery?’ This section hypothesizes that services need to renew focus on developing 
and improving existing technology through evolutionary acquisition and spiral 
development instead of embarking on ‘clean-sheet’ programs that have a history of 
underperforming on budget and schedule. First, the section surveys the existing literature 
on the subject and then moves into two comparative case studies. The first case study 
focuses on the DDG-1000 v. the DDG-51 and the second focuses on the F/A-18 Super 
Hornet vs. the F-22 Raptor. Although many studies have compared and contrasted these 
programs, my research takes it a step further to see if incremental innovation produces 
the results the U.S. needs to maintain its superiority into the 21st Century.  
Literature Review 
The world of defense acquisition reform is very complicated and there is no single 
solution to the problem. Scholarship on the issue ranges from explaining bureaucratic 
mismanagement to ever evolving requirements, to over-zealous testing, evaluation, and 
design as a reason for high expense and slow results. My review looks into many pieces 
of existing scholarship, but center on how bureaucratic inefficiencies and over-zealous 
requirements lead to a slow and expensive process as causing issue in the process.  
Mismanagement 
John P. Kotter, in his article “Why Transitions Fail” highlights some of the issues 
that large-scale corporations and organizations face when attempting to transform 
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processes. He believes that groups fail to transform because of a combination of factions 
including “not establishing a sense of urgency,” “lacking a vision,” and “not anchoring 
institutional change.”  To the casual observer, a bureaucratic institution such as the 
Department of Defense faces all of these challenges, especially when its budget is seldom 
threatened by Congress. He argues that if an organizations to make a transition, it needs 
to follow through and institutionalize changes rather than allow the system to settle into 
status quo.112 Relating this piece to the Department of Defense is clear. The Department 
of Defense must not allow old Cold War era acquisition systems and thinking  entrench 
itself against innovative, leaner processes to optimize for operations in the 21st century. 
Col. William Fast, USA (Ret) writes in Improving Defense Acquisition Decision 
Making about the correlations of requirements and miscommunication between the 
acquisition decision makers. Currently, there are three major government bodies that deal 
with traditional Program of Record acquisitions, or large, planned acquisitions that will 
be integrated in the force. Previous acquisition reformed aimed at achieve private sector 
like efficiencies, but ended up creating a process where multiple offices guide 
requirements, budgets, and milestones. This complex process is compounded by lack of 
managers in senior leadership who either centralize control of the project or decide on 
requirements so late that they have a negative effect on the project. Instead of making the 
whole process efficient, this just stove pipes decision-making and does not allow for 
projects to enjoy predictability. Colonel Fast suggests that departments pursue their own 
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acquisition strategies and link the requirements and budgeting process closer together to 
facilitate more communication.113 
Over-zealous requirements 
Thomas Donnelly, who at the time of publication, was co-director at the 
conservative leaning think-tank American Enterprise Institute, takes aim at the overly 
rigorous testing battery required of all new equipment. He uses the Bradley Infantry 
Fighting Vehicle, the M1 Abrams, the F-15 and the Littoral Combat Ship, the three 
former combat tested and proven vehicles, and the former being a new weapon system, as 
his prime case studies. During the development, many critics used the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation as cover to prove that the systems were inferior and too 
dangerous for our troops to use. He builds his argument to show how the Operational 
Test and Evaluation office exists only to say no, and that Congress should undue this 
heavy burden on the Department of Defense Acquisition system. Testing is a necessary 
quality control for programs and systems, but having such unachievable standards creates 
a situation where perfect is the enemy of the good and costs spiral trying to achieve 
this.114  
Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn argue that the Department of Defense, 
in many of the same ways all executive agencies are, embarked on a way to innovate 
their process the lose the true objective and stick to strict regulations which means they 
maintain the rigid structure Department of Defense needs to shed.  They credit the 
Department of Defense with showing flexibility due to the Global War on Terror, but 
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highlight how the acquisition landscape is significantly changing due to the higher 
percentage of services bought rather than goods. Gansler and Lucyshyn see this change in 
the marketplace as the biggest issue in procurement. The current acquisition system is 
optimized to purchase goods, and the Department of Defense does not have an efficient 
process to procure services.  They present eight specific solutions ranging from allowing 
commercial opportunity and reducing monopoly to better oversight and effective 
execution of contracts.115 The Department needs to show flexibility to the new nature of 
procurements. Just as the character of warfare changes and the Department and Armed 
Forces adapt, so does the economy and the Department needs to adapt to new ways to 
buy.  
Others think that over-reliance on private sector concepts are the downfall of the 
system and requiring competition to be used in an inappropriate manner can actually lead 
to increased cost. Todd Harrison argues in his piece “The Effects of Competition on 
Defense Acquisition” that unneeded competition can cause an increase in program cost as 
the Department of Defense foots the bill to build the developmental prototypes. Although 
this is not the case in all situations and can lead to cutting edge achievements, 
competition can also incentivize contractors to misrepresent price just to win a bidding 
war. He bases this on the fact that the Department of Defense is a customer and a market 
at the same time, so the same rules cannot apply as they do in the private sector.116 This 
highlights a big problem throughout the entire defense process. The Department is a hard 
customer to work with, and innovative new companies, such as those on the bleeding 
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edge of critical technologies, are pushed away from the marketplace, not for lack of 
funding, but for the difficulty of doing business with Defense Department..  
What should the Department do? 
The Department will face the question: ‘How can the Department of Defense 
continue to innovate and field superior weapons systems while maintaining predictability 
in cost and delivery.’ In a budget-constrained environment, the Department will have to 
prove to Congress and the public that it is using every defense dollar responsibly. The 
Department will also only have a few shots to perfect programs and deliver new combat 
capabilities. Unlike in older days, the Department may not have the money to correct 
mistakes or plug holes created by capability gaps. The Department will need to reduce 
risk to make sure they can obtain the items they need on budget and on schedule. By 
looking at select, but major, programs that are designed to advance and affect the United 
States military combat capability, and are mission critical for current and future strategy, 
there is a pattern that revolutionary technology does not provide the numbers or 
capabilities needed by the Department. Conversely, on the fielding of proven, 
evolutionary capabilities and platforms does provide the quantities and combat power 
needed to meet 21st century threats. 
Methodology and Definitions 
It is difficult to compare and contrast every single defense acquisition project. 
Different services have different requirements and acquisition preferences, and even 
though these projects follow uniformed acquisition regulations and processes controlled 
by the Secretary of Defense, each have very unique characteristics. 
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This study examines the F-22 and the F/A-18 because the programs began their 
development around the same time, were addressing a major capability upgrade, and the 
systems were needed in large quantities.117  
This examination is followed by the DDG-51 and DDG-1000. These two 
acquisitions represent a control group in my research. They are both Navy programs to 
address an ever-evolving technological need for the U.S. Navy and important to the Navy 
future shipbuilding and fleet plan, but in this case, the Navy moves forward with my 
hypothesis of innovating on existing technology.  
As the DDG-1000 faced drastic cuts, the Navy is moving forward with the DDG-
51 Flight III – the fourth iteration of the original design – to update the ship with the 
technology to face 21st century threats and provide the US Navy with budgetary latitude 
to meet fleet demands.118 The controlled comparison is set to test the relationship 
between the degree of innovation and the efficiency of the program. This study will be 
measuring the degree of innovation qualitatively by seeing how much of the program 
requires the development of immature technological and developmental concepts and 
suites of capabilities sought, Efficiency will be measured by how accurate forecasts for 
costs, delivery timeframe, and total quantity delivered.  
Definitions 
In the subsection below, there is a basic guideline most commonly used during the 
acquisition process (Figure 1.2), and explanations of both evolutionary acquisition and 
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spiral development. These two acquisition models, while used in the Department of 
Defense, represent the development strategy examined in this paper. 
Acquisition Chart (Figure 1.2)119 
 
Evolutionary Acquisition 
Evolutionary acquisition is nothing new to the Department of Defense. This 
acquisition strategy became a tool in the Department of Defense acquisition guidelines in 
1995.120 As demonstrated in figure 1.3, evolutionary acquisition is a way to make 
weapons systems open to adapting to added demands and capabilities.121 This strategy 
gives the Department of Defense the ability to keep its programs in a space where they 
are better suited to changes in funding, threat environment, evolved technologies, and 
Congressional oversight.122 
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Evolutionary Acquisition (Figure 1.3)123 
 
Spiral Development 
Spiral development is a process when developing systems and technology through 
conception, baseline testing, and fielding.124 Spiral development is “an iterative process 
that includes collaboration with the stakeholders/users and continuous feedback to 
provide the best possible capability for a specific increment.”125 This type of 
development allows the Department of Defense to reduce risk in the system as the 
development of add on technology and capabilities would be inherently less complex and 
require less resources that a complete acquisition of a brand new capability. 
F/A-18 Super Hornet and the F-22 Raptor  
These planes represented a solution to modernize the combat power into the 21st 
century. This study fully realizes the shortfall of comparing both of these platforms, the 
designs of both aircraft are meant to address a separate threat, operate in different 
environments, adapt to different contingencies, and play a different role in their 
respective services arsenal. What can be derived from their study is how stakeholders 





received the programs, and how they addressed the needs they were supposed to fill. 
Looking at both of these programs, which had a similar, enough acquisition timeline for 
this study’s purpose, readers can surmise trends. Both of these programs navigated a 
budget-constrained environment in the 1990s, but with two very different results. These 
platforms were built to meet different requirements, but were pursued at similar times, 
but through different acquisition strategies.  
F/A-18E/F 
The Hornet and Super Hornet are still in the Navy and Marines fleet today. 
Initially starting as an Air Force program, the Navy was able to make the fighter its 
own.126 The program developed out of Navy and Marine Corps needs to make up for the 
shortfalls in the legacy F/A-18A-D.127   The Super Hornet is one of the most successful 
aviation programs in the service’s history.128 The Navy wanted a new fighter that had a 
longer range, increased speed, and ability to recover more ammunition from sorties, a 
heavier combat payload, and increased survivability.129 On top of this, the Department of 
Defense issued a directive in 1987 instructing both the US Navy and US Air Force to fill 
the fighter gap that would be created while waiting for the USAF F-22 and the then 
planned US Navy, A-12, which was subsequently cancelled.130  
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In response the United States Navy commissioned the “Hornet 2000’ study, which 
provided 4 options to upgrade the Hornet fleet.131  The configuration picked represented 
an incremental upgrade, providing a cost effective solution, and address the upgrade 
issues facing the legacy Hornets at the time. 132 This program, initially supposed to be a 
stop gap for the future capability, turned out to be the centerpiece of the future of naval 
aviation when, in 1991, the Department of Defense significantly reduced the amount of 
aviation projects the Navy would be able to pursue. Instead of the carrier deck being 
filled with new fighter and attack aircraft like the upgraded F-14D and the A-12, the F/A-
18E/F would be the future.133  
In 1992, the F/A-18E/F Super hornet entered the Engineering Manufacturing and 
Design (EMD) stage of the acquisition process, as the Legacy Hornet already proved the 
viability of the concept.  The Navy began procuring the larger more capable Super hornet 
.n FY 1997.  The F/A-18E/F first arrived in the defense community in September 1995. 
The aircraft met all of the Navy’s stated capabilities and requirements. It was able to 
accomplish this on budget and underweight.134 The aircraft participated in its first combat 
sortie in November 2002, when Super hornets conducted airstrikes inside of Iraq’s no fly 
zones. The Super hornet performed superbly, dropping twice the amount of ordinance of 
other aircraft in the air wing and costing less to operate per flight hour.135 As of the FY17 
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NDAA debates, the U.S. Navy is still actively pursuing Super hornets to fill critical 
capability gaps and shortfalls presented by a delayed F-35C. 136  
 Currently the Navy plans to have F/A-18A-Ds in the fleet until the mid-2020s 
and F/A-18E/Fs in the fleet until 2035. With the continuing delays of the F-35C 
Lightening II, the US Navy is considering pushing these aircraft past their original 
retirement date, and even modifying them more to fill critical roles in future carrier air 
wings.137 The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) from 2012 on the F/A-18E/F records 
the program as costing $50.05B in total and the Department of the Navy procuring a total 
of 552 Hornets.138 
F/A-22  
In the 1980s the United States Air Force looked to replace the F-15 Air 
Superiority fighter with a next generation aircraft. This aircraft was supposed to field new 
technology and field capabilities that would be able to defeat all known and future air 
threats, and also provide a limited ability to strike ground targets.139 The U.S. Air Force 
saw some of the newer Soviet jets having aerodynamic capabilities that would challenge 
the current inventory and possibly best them in future fights. The Air Force determined a 
need for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), through studies and Air Force 
determination.  The leaders at the time believed that a new materials, stealth technology, 
and different aerodynamic qualities would make fighters like the F-16 and F-15 obsolete 
                                                        
136 Gould, Joe. "Lawmakers: Give US Navy More F/A-18s." Defensenews, March 2, 2016. 
137 Majumdar, Dave. "US Navy's Sixth-Generation F/A-XX Fighter: Just a 'Super' Super Hornet?`." The 
National Interest, July 26, 2016, 2016, sec. The Buzz. 
138 Select acquisition report (SAR) F/A-18E/F. 2011. Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval (DAMIR), RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)523-549. 
139 Gertler, Jeremiah. 2013. Air force F-22 fighter program. Congressional Research Service, RL31673. 
 59 
by the early 2000s. In 1986, the Air Force put out a request for proposal.140 It took four 
years to build and test airframe and propulsion prototypes, and in 1991 the Air Force 
awarded a $10 billion contract to move the F-22 program forward.  From the inception of 
the program, the design was expected to be challenging. The Air Force wanted a fighter 
that would dramatically reduce pilot workload, bring online new sensor capability, and 
change the character of air war. Throughout its decades long process Congress and the 
Department of Defense altered funding, requirements, and program cost estimates, 
making it more difficult to justify the cost of the programs. To add to this, the Cold War’s 
cessation altered the strategic calculus in the minds of many policy makers. The cuts in 
defense spending made the Department of Defense and Congress hungry for programs to 
reduce to realize cost savings.  The program endured multiple funding cuts, directed by 
Congress, because of cost growth and questions about future need. At one point the 
House Appropriations committee suggested zeroing out the program (Advance Tactical 
Fighter version) because of cost growth and justification issues.141 
The Air Force plan for the F-22 was to replace the F-15 with 750 F-22 fighters. 
The number was severely reduced, until finally, in FY 2007, Congress authorized a final 
quantity of 183.142  The aircraft, first flying in 1997 – a full seven years after the YF-22 
concept was demonstrated and evaluated. In total this aircraft program cost $67.3B in FY 
2010 dollars for a total of 179 aircraft.143 The aircraft serves in combat roles and is seen 
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as a strong forward presence marker for the United States, but in such limited numbers, 
the airframes and the aircrews are a very precious resource.  
These delays and cost overruns were created because of the challenges that 
bringing a new, revolutionary technology online cause. Specificially the F-22 had issues 
with developing its engine, perfecting its stealth features, integrating the avionics, and 
building the electronic warfare and protection packages necessary to help it survive a 
modern combat situation.144  These cost overruns and schedule delays made the F-22 
program a ripe target for Congress and the Obama administration to target and an 
unnecessary expenditure. Of particular significance, an amendment vote during the 
deliberation of the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act removed $1.7 
billion dollars in authorization for 7 more F-22 frames. This vote helped to solidify the 
administrations talking point that the U.S. military should not be investing in cold war 
technology and instead invests in technologies for gray zone and low intensity 
conflicts.145 
 
DDG-51 v DDG-1000 
DDG-1000 
The DDG-1000 was developed by the United States Navy under the guise of the 
DD(X) program and is designed for land attack and operation in the littorals.146 The ship 
will provide a much-reduced radar cross-section as well as an increased survivability 
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against 21st century threat while “meeting validated Marine Corps fire support 
requirements.”147 The program began in January 8th, 1995 when the DD21 program, 
which was planned to replace the older DDG-51, began its Cost and Operational 
Analysis. In January 1998, the U.S. Navy identified risks in the program such as a new 
hull and immature combat systems, but these developments would significantly reduce 
the profile, crewing requirements and lead to an overall cost savings over the DDG-51. 
The DD(x), which was now known as the DDG-1000 program, received authorization to 
enter low rate production, and the US Navy awarded the initial building contracts. In 
mid-year 2008, Congress began investigating an alternative to the DDG-1000 and, in 
February 2008, the President’s budget request modified the total procurement amount to 
three DDG-1000s. A United States Navy study known as the Future Surface Combatant 
Hull Study proved that an updated DDG-51 with new technology and structure upgrades 
will be the most cost effect solution to the Fleets future need.148 The program 
subsequently was restructured to remove some of the riskier technology. Initially the 
program planned for the procurement of 32 ships, but the program, which was suffering 
cost overruns, saw incremental decreases in total procurement until the US Navy settled 
on 3 ships.149 Currently the program has cost around $22.4B, with a procurement cost of 
$13.2B150 The ship is not considered to be combat capable until FY 2019, which is 
almost 4 years past the Navy’s 2010 estimates.151 In part, these cost overruns were caused 
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by the U.S. Navy’s risky approach to technology. The Navy was only able to bring 5 out 
of the 11 new technologies to a mature state by 2018, and much of this was due to the 
failure to validate any technology before incorporating it.152 This highlights the 
concerning nature of revolutionary technology and acquisition and the effects that 
burdensome requirements can have on a program. Program managers and designers 
wanted to build a ship that would change the face of naval warfare but instead dived 
headlong into a risky project without validating requirements and enabling technologies 
to a degree that would provide a more protected acquisition process. 
The DDG- 1000 faces different issues now. The mission that it was supposed to 
fulfill is no longer the stated purpose of the destroyer.  The ship can no longer provide the 
ship to shore fire support it was designed to provide. The shells for the massive land 
strike guns that the ship is armed with does not have rounds to fire. The Long-Range 
Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP) is way over budget and not cost effective to use in 
combat or procure in large quantities. The Navy had to rebuild requirements for the 3 




Procurement cost growth (Does not include Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation.)(Figure 1.3) 154 
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The US Navy started the DDG-51 program in the latter half of the 1970s. This 
ship produced is an AEGIS air defense system destroyer, which is able to perform 
multiple missions independently. The US Navy first procured the DDG-51 in 1985 and 
saw delivery in 1991.155The US Navy has a total of 62 in service and a total of 74 were 
delivered (based on FY 14 numbers) and is procuring more.156 The DDG-51 has seen 
multiple spiral upgrades ranging from DDG-51 to DDG-51 Flight IIa. These 
improvements saw changes to the structure and equipment.  
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The US Navy is now in the midst of developing and procuring the DDG-51 Flight 
III ship including an upgraded Air Defense and Missile Radar (AMDR).157 The total 
DDG-51 program cost as of a 2015 SAR is $98B with a total of 82 ships planned to 
purchase.158 
Congress is also more apt to support an acquisition program such as this, and even 
allow for the service to build in more flexibility. The 2018 National Defense 
Authorization Act authorized the United States Navy to enter into a multi-year buy of the 
ships, and put money into the program to allow for 3 ships to be purchased instead of 2, 
which was requested by the Navy. Senate and House Appropriators, who are in charge of 
writing the legislation that actually obligates the money from the United States Treasury, 
have not shown support to increasing the program, but there is support from key 
members.159 This multi-year contract follows an initial authorization in 2013,160 which 
authorizers and appropriators do not always support as they lose some aspects of their 
oversight power. Beyond the fact that a multiyear contract could potential save up to 10 
percent in construction costs throughout the life of the contract, this shows that Congress 
trusts the program enough to the program the authority and tools it needs to move 
forward quickly.161 
New versus improved? 
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The F/A-18 proved to be one of the more successful acquisition projects that 
allowed for the U.S. Navy to modernize its carrier fighter wing, while not embarking on a 
costly, often lengthy program to field new systems. The F/A-18E/F represents a fast, 
efficient way to get weapons to the warfighter. The Navy focused on improving a design 
that had already achieved success in the naval aviation environment, and were able to 
manage risk in the project because of this much more effectively. The F/A-18 represented 
an evolution in the design rather than a clean sheet design. The United States Navy was 
able to procure the aircraft in the quantities needed for its strategic and tactical goals, and 
it could do this at a palatable cost to the taxpayer. The F/A-18 Super hornet is continuing 
to develop and grow and is an integral part of the United States Navy future fleet. This 
year Boeing and the United States Navy embarked on a program to make the F/A-18 
Super hornet Block III variant.162 The United States Navy also plans on buying close to 
80 more F/A-18 Super hornets in the future to help make up for the strike fighter shortage 
it is facing on its decks.163 The F/A-18E/F block III will be upgraded with the newest 
technology, such as Active Electronic Scan Array radars, Infrared Search and Track to 
detect stealth threats, and multiple other upgrades. It will be able to communicate with 
the 5th generation F-35, and will have advanced stealth features to help reduce its profile 
and allow it to operate far into the future.164 These upgrades could see the F/A-18 series 
of aircraft serving vastly longer than planned and providing the capabilities and coverage 
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of requirements that will continue to ensure the United States can respond to the 
contingencies it faces. 
Schedule 
The F/A-18E/F significantly fewer schedules slip between two important 
milestones in the acquisition.165 In a budget restricted and time restricted environment, 
schedule slips and cost overruns can create issues. The United States Marines opted not 
to purchase upgraded Super Hornets and instead remained using the F/A-18 Legacy 
version, relying on the fact that the F-35 would be online to replace the aging jets. Fast 
forward to today, even though the F-35B (United States Marine Corps version) is in 
production, its price tag and issues with system immaturity have delayed it and resulted 
in increased reliance on legacy fighters. The USMC now needs to resort to extending the 
life of older aircraft, which is placing enormous strain on the older aircraft.166 The data 
above shows that an aircraft that relies on spiral innovation off of a legacy platform, it 
will have a better chance of being delivered on time and schedule.     
The DDG-1000 proves the same issues for the United States Navy. The ship is not 
expected to be combat capable until 2019, a full 4 years after the Navy anticipated in 
2010. When the DDG-1000 system goes online, it will not do so in force as only 3 are 
being procured. This is also at astronomical cost, which in a budget conscience 
environment is unacceptable if the force wants to prove to some in Congress and the 
public that projects the Department spends on will prove to be effective. The DDG-1000, 
while providing a revolutionary platform, provides it at astronomical costs, and does not 
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work as intended. In juxtaposition,  the data above alone shows that the DDG-51s provide 
a cost effective solution to provide ships en masse, and with spiral development and 
evolution of new technology, the DDG-51 system will be upgraded to remain lethal in the 
21st century. Already the DDG-51 class of ships can provide a multitude of different 
capabilities while also providing the quantities to deploy. The Navy needs this as its ship 
purchases have not fulfilled need. The DDG-1000 and even the Littoral Combat ship 
represented programs that were filled with risk of new untested technologies and design. 
Costing time and money that the Navy will need to us for future requirements, the DDG-
51 is left to fill the gap that still exists to this day.   
Quantity an issue?  
Although the F-22 is now operating in our active force and proving to be a 
significant asset in force deterrence, it was produced in extremely low numbers compared 
to what was initially planned. Because the USAF only procured 187 F-22s while retiring 
around 250 older fighters, the USAF is facing a smaller tactical fleet than planned.167 The 
USAF wants to make up for this gap and continue to retire aircraft by purchasing more F-
35, which reached IOC in August of 2016, but as of the time of this paper, the United 
States is still struggling to pay for the F-35 buys in large enough quantities to fulfill the 
needed force structure.168  
The United States Navy, in stark contrast, has a platform that meets the 
requirements of the force, in a number needed for the future structure of the force, and 
has the ability to buy more aircraft at a price that will not break the budget of the 
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Department of Defense. These issues are also faced with the U.S. Navy ship building 
campaign. Due to challenges across the globe, the United States Navy is planning on 
building a robust, large-numbered, blue-water navy to deal with threats and operations 
such as freedom of navigation to counter-piracy. The United States Navy is in need of a 
much-expanded navy, according to their shipbuilding plans by the 2020s.169 The DDG-
1000s reduction in ship numbers creates a specific challenge to this as the United States 
Navy is only supposed to procure 3 of these hulls, a full 29 hulls less than originally 
intended, which creates a large gap in planned procurement. In contrast, if you look at the 
DDG-51, it is a program that is still producing ships, and in large numbers needed. For 
significantly reduced spread cost, the United States Navy was able to purchase a 
significantly larger number of larger surface combatants, at a time when United States 
forward naval presences is needed and the country does not have the time to wait for 
systems to come online.  There is one down draw to this approach though.  The DDG-51, 
although a capable ship, that is available for deployments, does not have the requirements 
to be able to adapt to some of the future weapon system slated to come online in the naval 
domain. The DDG-51 flight III, which will not fully come online until 2023, will not be 
able to expand its design and useable space enough to fulfill all of the power 
requirements needed for all of the advanced systems.  The United States Navy is moving 
forward on designing the Large Surface Combatant (LSC) with a evolutionary design and 
procurement concept.170 
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The United States is facing a dilemma moving into the 21st century. The rules 
based global system that the U.S. created after World War Two is being challenge by 
both a resurgent Russia and an ever increasingly aggressive China. Beyond those two 
major geopolitical threats, the United States is also facing an increased threat from 
violent non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to 
name a few. The United States Department of Defense will have to adapt to being able to 
build and procure weapons systems in a fashion that they can continue to maintain 
superiority in all realms of conflict. This paper examines one of the possible tools to 
accomplish that goal. The purpose of this argument and examination is not to direct or 
detract the Department of Defense innovation process or footing. Innovation is necessary 
and the technology provided by programs such as the F-22, F-35, and DDG-1000 are 
groundbreaking and necessary for securing and advancing our preeminence and 
domination in the security sphere. But these evolutions came at incredible cost and still 
leave the force short of the needed capabilities. These advances can be made in a cheaper 
and more effective way if the Department of Defense pursues a spiral development 
strategy coupled with evolutionary acquisition. The Pentagon needs to move from a cold 
war acquisition footing to a leaner, more agile program, which is needed to procure the 
tools, which will protect the United States far into the future.  The Department of 
Defense, now more than ever, needs to use the defense dollar wisely and in a transparent 
manner. As exemplified above, taking large technical risks, while offering great increases 
in capabilities, also can serve to drain resources and time. This just serves to increase the 
burden on the existing forces and delays inevitable modernization and recapitalization, 
which will have to be done in the future, in a potentially tighter fiscal environment.  
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Making Sense of it All: How to Maintain the Edge? 
 
 The U.S. military and defense apparatus needs to approach acquisitions of 
systems in a new way. The doctrine and concepts behind the approaches are sound. 
Systems of systems have led to a complete technological overmatch on the battlefield, but 
these benefits come with risk. In the pursuit of new technologies, the Department of 
Defense has found itself in multiple situations where billions in investment has led to 
nothing. In this current fiscal and political environment, these mistakes can be fatal to 
programs and the department.  
 The military faced similar issues in the 1930s. The world was facing multiple 
threats, the global political situation was in turmoil and still recovering from the wake of 
the First World War, and a global depression had ravaged world economies. The U.S. 
Government needed to navigate through fiscal challenges, political angst, and competing 
ideologies about the nation’s role in the world. The military, with the technology and 
assets it had, embarked on building up for a war that was all to clear on the horizon. The 
United States Navy was bridled by arms treaties up to the last minute, but because of a 
strong industrial base and adaptation of existing technologies. The United States Navy 
also benefited from the ingenuity of the American tactician and warfighter. Aircraft 
Carriers proved to be powerful weapons, but only when put in the right hands and used 
the correct way. The United States developed the PAC-10 carrier tactic that turned these 
modern day weapons into modern successes and a tool to project dominating U.S. power 
for years. Innovation, adaptability, and flexibility were the keys the United States Navy 
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used to propel itself into a dominant role in the world. The United States also had a strong 
industrial, political, and civilian sector to support the Services needs. This has not 
changed today, but the Department of Defense should consider the accomplishments that 
propelled it into the dominant position it holds today. 
 World War Two proved to play a strong role in incubating the aircraft carrier. As 
the need for ships and power projection in the Pacific grew ever stronger, the Navy 
worked a new concept for aircraft carriers and created one of the most powerful naval 
formations in history.  This ingenuity is exactly what the Department needs.  
 Moving forward to the 21st century, the world has similar factors controlling 
political discourse. 2007 and 2008 saw a large global recession that the west is still 
struggling to recover. The global political order is at threat from multiple actors, and the 
United States is working through different fiscal and political constraints. The United 
States military and procurement in the Department of Defense is not immune to this. 
Although the problem is only worsened by the uncertainty coming from Congress in the 
form of the Budget Control Act, and uncertainty with appropriations, recent procurement 
strategies have caused trouble as well.  
After the Cold War, the Department of Defense spent an immense amount of 
money to modernize and revolutionize United States forces, much of which was spurred 
by the pursuit of the “system of systems’ vision for the military. This caused the loss of 
precious time and resources and has given space for our adversaries to catch up. The case 
of the Joint Tactical Radio System proves this as the United States saw heavy investment 
into a technology that did not provide the warfighter the capability they needed, but 
rather saw the Department of Defense rapidly look for a solution to fill an immediate 
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need. This example is not alone. The Department of Defense’s past is littered with over 
budget and under producing defense projects that have put our forces at a loss. This study 
looks at just one of them, but projects like the Future Combat System, Airborne Laser, 
and the RAH-66 Comanche stealth helicopter are some other great examples of the 
Department pursing needed replacements only to produce huge price tags and capability 
gaps. McKenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute believes these programs and 
other alone wasted $75 billion dollars and left the United States facing $370 billion in 
deferred modernization efforts. This will only serve to put more pressure on 
modernization and procurement budgets as the United States moves closer to the end of 
the life for many of its major tactical and strategic combat systems.171  
 The Department and Services should not give up on research and innovation, but 
there approach needs to be more conservative and risk mitigated. The cases of the F/A-
18, F-22, DDG-1000, and DDG-51, while different systems fulfilling different 
requirements, paint a picture. Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development helps to 
bring systems online in the quantities needed to fulfill requirements. In a high risk world 
and facing competing priorities in the Department of Defense and more generally in 
federal spending, increased costs and delays in any project could make it vulnerable to 
cutting and reduction in scope.  
 The U.S. has also had success in this type of rapid, but evolutionary acquisition 
approach that contained risk and provided solutions to rapidly developing problem sets, 
proving that the military is capable of these changes at a smaller scale. Big Safari, an Air 
Force program that was used to modernize and update specialized airframes at a lower 
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cost to the taxpayer. Its unique management structure allows for quick and more efficient 
acquisition of systems at lower cost to the department. Because of this, the Air Force is 
able to adapt and modernize legacy airframes to meet current threats and respond to rapid 
need. 172 
 With a more conservative approach to acquisition, the U.S. could invest in proven 
systems and concepts and update them to meet the needs of the 21st century threat 
environment. This responsible spending profile would also allow the Department more 
leverage in negotiating and justifying budgets to Congress. Expensive programs that go 
over budget and off-schedule have created fatigue in funding ever-higher defense 
budgets. The more responsible program strategies would help to mend that trust. If this 
change does not happen, and quickly, the military could experience  
The United States was able to harness naval aviation and build a strong and 
innovative strategy to incorporate these technologies into naval strategy.  The United 
States was able to do this in part because of the strong industrial base, but also because of 
sound development of naval doctrine and incremental increasing of capabilities. The first 
two fast attack carriers began as cruisers, but had to be converted to meet treaty 
obligations. The U.S. Navy figured how to use this non-traditional technology, 
incrementally upgraded its capabilities, an introduced the fast attack carrier doctrine, all 
within a short time span.  Targeted investment in proven and within reach technological 
advances turned out one of the most formidable naval formation in history, and secured 
the United States’ position as the most capable and powerful military of the 20th century.  
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The United States needs to harness this ingenuity as it moves into the 21st century. 
Defense Budgets need to increase to meet the current requirements and needs of the 21st 
century, but the Department of Defense must use its resources wisely. The strategies of 
the past will inform the future. The Department of Defense needs to focus on acquisitions 
that are technically achievable as well. An issue that industry faces developing weaponry 
for the Defense Department is overburdening the process with requirements ending in 
unfeasible systems, such as the Joint Tactical Radio Systems’ Ground Mobile Radio. The 
Joint Tactical Radio System was a technological achievement as it helped introduce the 
concept of software defined radios across a broad spectrum of military applications, but 
the program broke under its own weight and never fully fielded due to cost overruns and 
lack of useful technical achievements. Moreover, the U.S. military pursued a revolution 
in military affairs aggressively as the thinking was that a modernized and interconnected 
force would rule the 21st century. While the thought process and doctrine was sound, 
pushing the technological envelope to realize gain created political and fiscal issues that 
hamstrung modernization efforts. 
Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development can prove cost effective and 
introduce new and needed technology while removing the risk from the procurement 
system. The F-22, F/A–18, DDG-1000 class ship, and DDG-51 class ship show that this 
can prove true. In this case the DDG-51 and F/A -18, which are legacy systems, have 
been upgraded to fight in the 21st century, and have proven successful in that transition. 
The cutting edge technology in the F-22 and DDG-1000 proved incredible capability, but 
cost overruns and technical challenges limited the system buys and the small quantities 
procured did not fulfill the intended requirement. This left the Department with a large 
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bill and still capability gaps to fill and systems to modernize and recapitalize. The 
Department must decide how to approach technology in the most cost effective manner. 
That means the Department needs to look at it developing new technologies or building 
and evolving on old system to adapt with new technology. Because newer technology 
failed to provide the numbers and quantities of systems needed to fulfill current 
requirements, the legacy forces are beginning to fatigue. Moving forward, this cannot 
happen. With the age of systems and fatigue on the force at a close to all time high, a 
refresh needs to happen and happen fast. But until risk is reduced from the process, 
money will not be used efficiently.   
 This is not to say that there is no place for revolutionary acquisition. As 
demonstrated by this study the U.S. Navy in World War Two and countless other 
examples throughout history, pushing the technological edge is a must to advance 
strategy and capability. Even in the case of the Joint Tactical Radio System, the F-22 and 
the DDG-1000, the programs may not have fully developed, but they did provide a new 
understanding of what technologies are needed in the future and how they can be attained 
and how they can be successfully operated. This study does not look at some of the other 
questions about the acquisition process either. By pursuing evolutionary and spiral 
processes, the Defense Department can successfully work within the confines of the 
current system. Another avenue all together, that would require much more political 
capital is how do we change the system to make it work better. The Congress iis working 
to do this right now, but it is not a easy process. Looking at the factors that make 
requirements so burdensome and disconnect the cost and time estimate process are 
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important steps to realizing how the U.S. can make a more efficient system so that 
innovation is not stifled.  
 The Department of Defense and the Services will benefit from continuing to 
pursue strategies that provided the quantities and technology refreshes needed to meet the 
needs and requirements in the future. As in World War Two the U.S. needs to work 
within the constraints of the environment. In the case of World War Two, the U.S. had to 
work within the confines of the Washington Treaty and other iterations of arms 
agreements until the eve of the war, but was able to use previously built equipment and 
industrial capacity to invent and innovate strategy to bring the U.S. military into the 
powerful spot that it inhabits today. Moving forward to the 21st century, the U.S. military 
faces a similar situation. Budgets and politics harness unlimited research and 
procurement spending. The Department and Services will need to pursue a less risky 
acquisition and innovation strategy to field more proven technology. Instead of focusing 
on clean sheet brand new innovative designs, acquisition should be focused on bringing 
new innovative technologies on board proven systems. This evolution of technology will 
reduce risk in the procurement system and restore political trust in defense acquisition 
programs. 
 The Department of Defense has already embarked on this, with updating legacy 
systems, promoting open architecture, and pursuing cost effective upgrades with 
commercially available technology. There is still more to accomplish. This study shows 
some of the data driven arguments for pushing a more conservative and risk-controlled 
approach, but does not seek to be the end of the conversation. More study will be needed 
in the future to make sure that innovation is not stamped out in the name of risk 
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reduction, but the United States needs to pursue strategies that are stewards of the tax 
payer dollar to maintain the position that the institution currently maintains. The farther 
the United States moves into the future the more pressing this issue will become. The 
Department of Defense will continue to grapple with increasing modernization and 
procurement costs all while the fiscal situation becomes grimmer for the United States. 
Debt, deficits, and interest payments will continue to rise and threaten to crowd out 
investment in defense and non-defense spending alike.173 By that time it will be too late 
to change course and rescue federal spending. Without changes to United States 
government spending deficits will remain large and investors may not be willing to take a 
risk on U.S. debt without larger interest rates, at that point, a significant portion of 
revenues will divert to servicing the debt and Department of Defense priorities, among 
many other government priorities will have to compete much more fiercely for 
resources.174 The Department of Defense cannot fix those larger fiscal issues, but it can 
spend in a responsible fashion. This will allow for supporters in Congress and the public 
to continue to support spending. 
 Finally, in no ways is this piece arguing for the total elimination of revolutionary 
acquisition, but a reflection of the changing character of threats, budgets, and innovation. 
Commercial entities can now produce the leading edge technology that was once 
exclusive to the defense community. As we move into new domains of warfare this will 
continue to change. Silicon Valley and private industry are leading in innovation in the 
cyber world and space. The government does not have the flexibility to adapt at the speed 
of Moore’s law. While the U.S. should continue to push the envelope in revolutionary 
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technologies and utilizations of new technology, the Department of Defense needs to 
leverage new technology in old systems to get the best effect. This will help to control 
costs and bring new technology online. A side effect of this could be the transfer of risk 
from the Department of Defense to the private sector, or at least a risk sharing profile.  
 Throughout history there have been many examples of countries and specific 
defense programs falling by the wayside because of misplaced investments and slow 
development of new technologies. The Department of Defense could face those 
challenges if not careful to maintain the trust of taxpayers and Congress. In this era of 
budget uncertainty and the impending bow wave of equipment modernization the threat is 
acute.  The Department and Congress are already looking at ways to develop and 
implement new technologies and strategies to modernize in a cost effective fashion. The 
gears of government are slow and institutional inertia is hard to reverse, but without 
permanent change to these processes and procedures, the United States could go the way 
of the British at the eve of naval aviation when it comes to security in the 21st century.  
 Congress also has a role to play in this change as much of this will require 
legislative change. Congress is seeking this change and have been working at a much 
higher pace to affect change through legislation. Between fiscal year 2016 and 2018 
NDAAs Congress pass 247 major provisions, which represents a much higher rate that in 
the previous 10 NDAAs.175 Generally Congress is targeting how to makes acquisitions 
more rapid, efficient, flexible to respond to the ever-changing threat environment, but 
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also to make government contracting and the Department of Defense a more inviting  
environment for newer and more cutting edge companies and sectors to work with.176 
 If the Department of Defense and the United States are to continue into the 21st 
century with the qualitative dominance the country and its armed forces have come to 
have against its adversaries, defense spending will need to increase, but this increase 
needs to be invested more efficiently. The Department and the men and women in it have 
the ingenuity and talent to implement some of the ideas in this research. When risk is 
reduced in the system there will be on budget result and capability increases. 
                                                        
176 Ibid.  
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